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All Roads Are Good: Beyond the Lexicon of
Christianity in Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Verna C. Sanchez *
I studied under Grandpa Fools Crow, a Lakota holy man. He said
never bad-mouth anybody, never be envious or jealous of anybody;
if you are; you won't be on the right road yourself, 'cause all
roads are good.
-Abe Conklinl
Thou shalt have no other gods before me . . . for I the Lord thy
God am a jealous God . ...
-Exodus2
I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.
-St. John3

INTRODUCTION
The journey of religious freedom in this country has been a linear one.

* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law, B.A. Clark
University, 1977, J.D. Northeastern University School of Law, 1981. I wish to thank both
Hans W. Leo and Professor Linda Fitts Mischler for their thoughtful and insightful readings, comments, criticisms and suggestions, as well as their encouragement and support,
throughout the writing of this Article. I also want to thank my Research Assistant, Andrea
Hromi for all of her work on this Article. Finally, many thanks to Stephanie Edwards and
Nan Kelly of the Roger Williams Law Library for all of their quick and diligent work.
l. ALL ROADS ARE GooD: NATIVE VOICES ON LIFE AND CuLTURE 7 (Terence Winch ed.,
1994) [hereinafter ALL ROADS ARE GooD].
2. Exodus 1:20. "For the Lord thy God is a jealous God." Deuteronomy 15:6.
3. John 9: 14.
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Its point of departure was, on one hand, tolerance for religious beliefs and
protection from state mandated religion, but on the other, an unspoken consensus that religion was, if not exclusively Protestantism, then certainly
Christianity. This course was set by the Founding Fathers and the fIrst
courts to interpret the Free Exercise Clause, and there has been virtually no
deviation since. While there have been stops along the way which have
broadened slightly the highway traveled, there has been no change in direction, reevaluation of the itinerary, or toleration of alternate routes.
In this Article, I argue that in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise
Clause, religion has always been defmed in a linear, hegemonic way. This
monochromatic approach to the spiritual and sacred has worked as a roadblock, almost always preventing those who believe in and practice animist,
earth-based, non-monotheistic traditions from ever being permitted the same
level of religious freedom accorded others.
This Article examines the fundamental premises of monotheism and absolutism founded in Judeo-Christian traditions and explores how they have
permeated Free Exercise jurisprudence and effectively blockaded the road to
equal constitutional protection to those walking other paths. The narrowness of the jurisprudence is not merely a quaint historical fact. It continues
to shut out all but fairly narrow views of religion, religious beliefs, traditions, and ideas about the sacred and spiritual. This remains true, despite
the slight expansion of the defmition of religion applied in more recent Free
Exercise cases. The demand for absolutes in religiot1--{)ne God, one way,
an "ultimate and comprehensive 'truth",4-is matched by courts' aversion to
"ad hoc justice,,5 in the realm of Free Exercise. They are two sides of the
same coin, and they work together to deprive those who practice and believe
in earth-based religions, 6 of true legal protection for their rituals and beliefs.
The jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause has arrived at a crossroads.' If courts persist in applying the narrow, Judeo-Christian view of religion, then the linear journey will proceed, leaving many behind. If, however, courts choose to broaden their perspective, a more inclusive,
panoramic view of religion will emerge. This shift will require a systematic
and fundamental transformation of the underlying premises, biases, and
craving for absolute predictability manifested in current jurisprudence. It
calls for a commitment to recasting the analytical framework of the Free Exercise Clause, and reevaluating and reworking ideas about what constitutes
religion and religious belief.
4. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 210.
6. I will not attempt to define earth-based religions, for all the reasons set forth in this
Article. However, examples of earth-based religions, as I use the tenn here, include many
Native American spiritual beliefs and practices that recognize that all of nature is alive and
is sacred. Santeria is another such example of this type of spiritual tradition. A common
focal point of earth-based religions is the individual's relationship to nature.
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From the earliest days of the drafting, planning, and writing of the
United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights, two seemingly contradictory positions were in play. First, Americans would have a freedom of religion greater than that experienced under British rule. But second, this freedom was viewed from a perspective which assumed that those protected
were both believers in one God and Christians of one sort or another. This
assumption ran through the earliest jurisprudence of First Amendment Free
Exercise claims and continues, in varying degrees, to this day. Indeed, the
underlying assumption of Christianity has and continues to pervade American life.
This Article will consider the lexicon of Christianity in the jurisprudence
of the Free Exercise Clause, from its early roots to the present day. While
historically the idea of constitutionally ensuring the free exercise of religion
went hand in hand with the idea of opposing the establishment of religion by
the government, these ideas meant slightly different things for each of the
Founding Fathers. As Jesse Choper has noted, the framers were "animated
by several separate and sometimes opposing goals.,,7 However, those differences had a common foundation in Christian beliefs and practices. The narrowly constructed, monotheistic, Christian perspective, which colored the
struggle for religious freedom in the early days of this country, excluded
non-Christians (and some Christiansl from the ideas, rights and protections

7. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRET ATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 3 (1995).
Thomas Jefferson, for example, believed that "an established church constituted one of
the gravest threats to freedom of the mind because it provided the 'orthodox' doctrine
which civil authorities were to promote through coercive legal means." ARLIN ADAMS &
CHARLES EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 25 (1990). James Madison, later in life, reached the
conclusion that presidential religious proclamations (which he had issued), violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as did the chaplain system. JOHN A.
SEMONCHE, RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW WITH SOURCES 29 (1986). And although Madison had issued proclamations asking people to pray, he also vetoed an act for the District of Columbia, which
sought to establish an Episcopal church. Id. Roger Williams, perhaps not surprisingly,
was an advocate of the "Evangelical theory of separation," that is, church and state separation was necessary to protect the sanctity of the church. CHOPER, supra at 3. Williams, of
course, had been banished from Massachusetts by the Puritans because of his religious beliefs. SEMONCHE, supra, at 6.
8. "Basically, then, the regimes of almost all the colonies enthroned strictly defined
Protestant orthodoxies and called upon everyone for material and overt respect for the religious establishments ... , The disfavored minorities included deviant Protestants as well
as the more heretical Roman Catholics and Jews .... " MARVIN E. FRANKEL, FAITH AND
FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 24 (1994). Massachusetts Bay's immigration
policies are also instructive-restrictions affected "Quakers, Catholics, Jews, 'Familists,
Antinomians, and other Enthusiasts.'" John Witte, The Essential Rights and Liberties of
Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 380
(1996) (citation omitted). This kind of limited welcome was not confined to Massachusetts, but was true throughout New England. Id.
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of religious freedom. This legacy, to varying degrees, continues today. Although the language of the religion clause is neutral,9 the cultural context
and climate in which it arose was overwhelmingly Christian. to That perspective informed and shaped the early jurisprudence of First Amendment
claims.
Part I of this Article will examine the early jurisprudence of the Free
Exercise Clause. Because of the Christian lexicon, the framework for Free
Exercise analysis has been, and continues to be, religion-specific, at great
cost to those religions that do not derive from, or have any connection to, a
monotheistic, Judeo-Christian tradition. Courts' legal analysis of free exercise claims arising from beliefs or practices that stand outside this framework, such as polytheistic or animistic and/or non-hierarchical and noninstitutionalized religions, result almost inevitably in less protection and
fewer rights than those afforded Judea-Christian religions. The overwhelming, pervasive Judea-Christian framework generally hampers the equal and
fair treatment of Free Exercise claims falling outside this model.
This Judea-Christian-centered model and the dilemma it creates for
genuine religious freedom is best evidenced in the treatment of Native
American 11 religious claims by United States courts, throughout American
jurisprudential history and continuing through the present day. While paternalism or racism accounts for many of the wrongs committed against Native
Americans in this country, at least as to Indian Free Exercise claims, there is
more to the story. There is little or no acknowledgment by judges that they
are judging from within a purely Judea-Christian framework of thinking
about, defining or "measuring" religious beliefs and practices, which skews
their perspective when looking at other religions. This may be based on one
or more circumstances: a judge's own religious beliefs, traditions and experiences which consciously or unconsciously color his or her view of the
claim before the court; judicial precedent which, from its earliest days has
been developed from an explicitly Christian perspective; or the dominance of
Judeo-Christian values which permeates American culture. While there are
exceptions, it is a general truth that "other" belief systems do not, and cannot, "measure up" to Judea-Christian indicia of what constitutes a religious

9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990). In Carolina, for example, atheists were banned
from the colony, and all persons in the colony were required to be members of a church.
[d. at 1429. '''Any seven or more persons agreeing in any religion, shall constitute a
church' ... and could worship without molestation, provided they adhered to three tenets:
that there is a God, that God is to be publicly worshiped and that it is lawful and the duty
of every man to bear ... witness .... " [d. (citation omitted).
11. Throughout this Article, I use the terms Native Americans and Indians interchangeably.
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belief or practice worthy of constitutional protection. 12 Even the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act,13 has done virtually nothing to protect Indian
religious rights, in part because no private cause of action exists. 14 This is
almost equally true of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,15
which merely restored the pre-Smith compelling interest test,16 which itself
had done little to protect minority religions. 17 Even this limited relief is illu12. State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926), although dated, exemplifies this
principle. There, a court rejected a Crow's claim that possession of peyote was protected
by the First Amendment. In its holding that the criminalization of peyote possession was
consistent with maintaining the "peace, good order and morals of society," id. at 1073, the
court relied heavily on the Bible in its decision. "We do not find peyote or any like herb
mentioned by Isaiah, or by Saint Paul in his epistle to the Romans,nor does it seem from
the language employed that Saint John the Divine had any such in mind." Id. Of course I
am not saying here, or anywhere else in the Article, that religious freedoms are always
denied when they turn on beliefs or religions deviant from, or outside a Judeo-Christian
norm. Nor am I saying that religious claims based on Judeo-Christian religions always
succeed. However, the scales generally tip in favor of Judeo-Christian beliefs, and against
those outside that framework. See for example, some of the early Jehovah's Witness or
Mormon cases. Overall, those outside the Judeo-Christian framework have less success
and much greater difficulties obtaining meaningful protections under the law. Tushnet
states "sometimes Christians win, but non-Christians never do." See Mark Tushnet, "Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited," 1989 SUP. Cr. REv. 373,
381.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (amended 1994).
14. Havasupai v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990). "AIRFA does not
create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights." Id. at 1488 (citing Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (emphasis
added)). See also Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.S.D. 1982) (stating that the
Act does not create a cause of action in federal courts for violation of rights of religious
freedom); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. ICC, 702 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See generally Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom And Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447 (1985); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indians' Prayers?, 29 S.D. L. REv. 131 (1983); Rebekah J. French, Free Exercise of Religion On the Public Lands, 11 PUB. LAND L. REv.
197 (1990).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
16. An incidental burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling state interest "in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
17. See Tushnet, supra note 12; Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. Clll. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (noting that political branches more often
respect prominent, "majority" faiths). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on The Free Exercise Of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 947-60
(1989); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1,
56 (1993) (stating that the "essential to" language deleted from the Act would have made a
greater difference than simply restoring the pre-Smith compelling interest test). But see
James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1412 (1992) (pointing out that most free exercise claimants were losing even prior to Smith). For pro-Smith arguments, see Maria Elise Lasso,
Notes and Comments, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the
State of the Free Exercise Doctrine, 12 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 569 (1993); Elise West,
The Case Against A Right To Religion Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETlllCS &
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18
sory, as one federal district court declared the Act unconstitutional.
Although that decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit,19 the district court
decision may be a sign of things to come. 20 Constitutional history clearly
establishes the Christian roots of both the establishment of the United States
and the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 21 That assumption of
Christian belief continues to dominate the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise
Clause. Earth-based spritual traditions and practices, which tend to be noninstitutionalized, non-hierarchical, and nature-centered, stand in almost direct opposition to Christian structures and beliefs. As such, they present a
direct challenge to the current jurisprudential structure.
The majority of earth-based religious claims have been brought by Native Americans. Part II of this Article will examine a number of cases
where Native Americans sought protection for particular religious traditions,
beliefs and practices,22 and how those claims fared in the courts in light of
the lexicon of Christianity. As will be shown, the belief in "one way," as
defmed by Judeo-Christian traditions, continues to operate as a roadblock to
protections for non-Judeo-Christian beliefs.
Finally, Part III of this Article will look at current definitions of religion
relied upon by many courts. Some courts, as well as scholars, are looking at
how religion has been explicitly or implicitly defmed, how those defmitions
have excluded non-Christian religions, and to what effect. While wellPuB. POL'y 596-98 (1990) (arguing that the compelling state interest test leads to unpredictable results), cited in Lasso, supra, at 584, n.117; William P. Marshall, The Inequality
ofAnti-Establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 63.
18. Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.O. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d
1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
19. Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
20. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari and will hear the case this term.
1996 WL 375944, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (1996). For arguments about the constitutionality of
the Act, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.V. L. REv. 437 (1994); Eugene Gressman &
Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65
(1996); Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court At Its Word: The Implications for the
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995); Daniel O. Conkle, The Re-

ligious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance Of An Unconstitutional
Statute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting The Fox Into The Henhouse Under Cover Of Section 5 Of The 14th
Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 357 (1995).
21. "There are no religious establishments, no preference of one denomination of
Christians above another." Witte, supra note 8, at 373 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added); A Century Sermon on the Glorious Revolution, in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805 969, 988-99 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (emphasis
added). See also McConnell, supra note 10; Daniel O. Conkle, Dijferent Religions, Different Polities: Evaluating the Role of Religious Traditions in American Politics And
Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1994).
22. I use the terms religion and religious here for purposes of convenience, all the while
recognizing that doing so is perhaps not the most meaningful or helpful way of discussing
beliefs and practices outside Judeo-Christian, institutionalized religious doctrines. However, these are the terms the courts have typically used to measure the claims before them.
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intentioned, there are inherent problems in attempting to lock onto a single
defmition, even a broad one. I argue that the need for a fIXed defmition derives from a traditional Judea-Christian perspective and will continue to exclude those standing outside such a focus. Part ill will consider these new
defmitions and establish why these new approaches will fail to truly protect
religious freedoms. The rejection of both defmitions of religion and the interest in formulating them is a necessary and vital step in beginning to offer
true constitutional protections to non-Judeo-Christian religious claims.

PART I: FREEDOM TO BELIEVE-IN THE ONE
GOD WE TRUST
The Founding Fathers held differing positions regarding religion generally and Christianity in particular. These differences are consistent with the
general state of the political and religious culture of this country during the
eighteenth century. Although it is true that "most of the founding fathers
had not put much emotional stock in religion, even when they were regular
churchgoers,,,23 this was not necessarily reflected in the controlling view.
Rather, religion, specifically Protestant Christianity, was quickly and thoroughly implanted in American life. However, while there was no question
that religion would playa critical role in the formation of the American nation, the beginning days of the nation were, as historian Gordon Wood has
made clear, a time of upheaval and change. 24 "Paternal authority" was being questioned. "Even the authority of the supreme father of all, God himself, was not immune to challenge. ,,25 Gordon Wood suggests that a subtle
movement occurred, from a Puritan view based on the Old Testament, to a
Christ-centered New Testament focus. 26
Many of the theological struggles of late eighteenth century America
were cast in the same terms as the debates over parental child-raising. Did
people need coercion and the terror of eternal damnation by an absolute God
to make them righteous? Was it only fear for their future existence that
could make people bow to a sovereign God? Or could people be brought to
humility and salvation better through Christ's love and compassion?27
This shift in focus is evident in the various "camps" that formed around
the creation of the religion clause. These various stances naturally colored
the goals sought in framing the Bill of Rights and the perspectives behind

23. GoRDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 330 (1991)
[hereinafter G. WOOD]'
24. See generally G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 155-59.
25. Id. at 158. But see ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE
AND INSTITUTION 51 (1976). ("It is not from God the Father that we derive the idea of paternal authority; it is out of the struggle for paternal control of the family that God the Father is created.").
26. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 158.
27. Id.
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them While generalizations cannot accurately capture and reflect the true
dynamics of the time, they will be relied upon here simply as a means of
furthering the discussion. The Founding Fathers are often divided into several general categories for the purpose of discussing the religion clauses of
the First Amendment. Adams and Emmerich labeled these categories: 1)
the Enlightened Separationists; 2) the Political Centrists; and 3) the Pietistic
Separationists. 28
The Enlightened Separationists (Witte's enlightenment thinkers), including such men as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, believed strongly in
the idea of a clear separation of church and state. 29 As Witte has noted:
"The primary purpose of Enlightenment writers was political, not theological. They sought not only to free religion and the church from the interference of politics and the state, as did the evangelicals, but, more importantly,
to free politics and the state from the intrusion of religion and the church .
. ." Witte further noted: "To allow them to combine would be to their mutual disadvantage---to produce, in Thomas Paine's words, 'a sort of muleanimal, capable only of destroying, and not of breeding up. ",30
It was the Enlightened Separationists who probably best represented the
challenge to paternal authority that Wood has identified. Jefferson advocated a clear separation of church and state in order to protect the integrity
of the government. 31 Madison shared this view, but also believed that religion benefitted from such a separation. 32 This divergence of underlying intentions perhaps derived from the religious beliefs of each of these men at
the time they were engaged in the debates and discussions leading to the
drafting of the religion clause. Michael McConnell has noted that it is unclear what Madison's adult religious beliefs were, but that as a young man,
he attended a Presbyterian college (princeton), rather than "the more natural
course of study at the Anglican college, William and Mary.,,33 Jefferson,
like Paine, was a deist who repudiated Christian doctrine while accepting the
moral code of Christ. 34 Both Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, "went so far
28. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 21-31. I have chosen to follow their categories. For another view, see Witte, supra note 8. Witte has articulated four perspectives:
congregational Puritans, free church evangelicals (theological), enlightenment thinkers,
and civic republicans (political). Id. at 377. And, as Witte notes, these categories are not
in any way exhaustive of all the various influences, and frequently persons shifted from
one category to another. Id. at 377-78.
29. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 22-26.
30. Witte, supra note 8, at 383-84 (citation omitted).
31. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 24; CHOPER, supra note 7, at 3. Nonetheless,
Jefferson negotiated treaties which provided federal monies for the Christianization of
American Indians. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 29.
32. See CHOPER, supra note 7, at 3; ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25-26.
33. McConnell, supra note 10, at 26. But see ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25
("Though distrustful of institutional religion he remained an Episcopalian throughout his
life and maintained strong religious convictions.")
34. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 22.

.ii. 4_AA_
1I
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as to believe that the only thing worth keeping of the Christian faith was the
Sermon on the Mount. ,,35 Unlike Madison, Jefferson refused to issue religious proclamations when President. 36 His stance derived from a strong belief in the personal, and therefore private nature of religion. 37 Madison believed that religious freedom was an innate, God-given right, which was
beyond the purview of the government. 38 However, he also believed that religious diversity, in and of itself, safeguarded religious liberty.39
Madison ultimately defmed religion as a duty, determined by human
beings.
The obligations it entailed were to be interpreted by mankind and
rested on individuals rather than on society, much less the state . . .
'Spiritual tyranny,' built 'on the ruins of the civil authority,'
emerged when its supporters mistakenly erected 'ecclesiastical establishments' that manipulated the authority of the state to coerce
both religious and secular opinion. Throughout, Madison assumed
the plurality of religion ....40
The Pietistic Separationists fall somewhere in between Adams and
Emmerich's other two categories. Generally this group believes that the
government's role in this area was to encourage a climate which would be
favorable to voluntary religious devotion,41 a view generally advanced by
persons belonging to dissenting religious groups. "This theologically
grounded stance affIrmed that God has appointed two kinds of government
. . . which are distinct in their nature and ought never to be confounded together. ,,42 One of the leading proponents of this position was Isaac
Backus.43
The view which perhaps most influenced the religion clause44 was that
of the political centrists (Witte's "civic republicans"), exemplifIed by such
men as John Adams and George Washington. 45 These men all believed that
religion was necessary for and vital to a democratic government. 46 Despite
35. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 158.
36. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 29.
37. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 23. "It is important to remember that many
believers in the separation of religion and government were primarily interested in protecting religion from the state rather than vice-versa." SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 12.
38. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25.
39. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2.
40. JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 263
(1990) (citation omitted).
41. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 29.
42. Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 29. Another proponent of this view was John Witherspoon, the only clergyman to sign the Declaration ofIndependence. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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the defiance of the paternalistic structure that Wood has cited as a hallmark
of American life in the Eighteenth Century, concurrently there was a recognition that American society was fragmented, and needed the cohesiveness
that religion could provide. 47 In the area of religion, the colonial challenge to
"paternalist authority" concentrated on the established, monarchically related Church of England, not on organized religion itself (although manyenlightenment thinkers repudiated much of institutionalized Christianity),48 and
most certainly not on Christianity. While the tendency of Protestantism to
fragment was evident during this time,49 the new, unique experiment that
was revolutionary America was one that nonetheless operated within fairly
defined, clear parameters. Alexis De Tocqueville observed that "all of the
sects of the United States are comprised within the great unity of Christianity, and Christian morality is everywhere the same. ,,50 A white, Christian,
land-and-slaveowning patriarchy set the absolute boundaries for the American revolution. Christianity generally and Protestantism specifically, was a
unifying factor, "for religion was the way most common people still made
meaningful the world around them.,,51 This religious landscape has dominated the society and culture ever since. Gordon Wood has noted that with
the democratization of the nation, came evangelization. 52
"From the time of the Puritans to the present, the country has been
viewed in missionary terms. . .. What Protestantism did was synthesize,
from diverse sources, a view of man that it endowed with a religious mission.,,53 Despite their assertion of a "generic" religious/civil society, proponents of "multiple establishments," clearly advocated an explicitly Christian
47. The geographic distances, "surging popUlation and changing economic relationships
unsettled traditional hierarchies .... " G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 144. Thus, there was a
move away from the Church of England and a movement towards numerous other religious
sects. "In these mid-century decades succeeding waves of enthusiastic New Light Presbyterians, Separate Baptists, and finally Methodists swept up new converts .... " Id.
48. "Jefferson hated orthodox clergymen, and he repeatedly denounced the 'priestcraft'
for having converted Christianity into an 'engine for enslaving mankind' .... " Id. at 330.
That Jefferson, a slaveholder, could somehow divorce the institution of slavery from the
"enslaving" role of Christianity is but one of the many paradoxes of constitutional history.
See supra note 7.
49. "To some observers, 'Pennsylvania in 1750 was simply a chaos of sects,' and in
North Carolina an Anglican missionary complained about the 'great number of dissenters
of all denominations .... ' Religious proliferation was so extensive in Long Island, New
York, that attempts to count denominations were meaningless because the number changed
almost daily." FORREST WOOD, THE ARROOANCE OF FAITH: CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN
AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12-13 (1990) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter F. WOOD].
50. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 314 (Phillips Bradley ed. &
Henry Reeve trans., 1966).
51. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 330.
52. Id. at 331. "If the democratic revolution of the decades following the Declaration of
Independence meant the rise of ordinary people, it meant as well the rise of popular evangelical Christianity." Id. at 330.
53. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2.
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version of America. 54 "Christianity, not just 'religion,' propelled mankind to
better governments and just societies.,,55
George Washington, while not particularly religious, nonetheless, believed in the benefits of religion for promoting order. 56 John Adams, a political centrist, issued presidential religious proclamations which "urg[ed]
dependence on God as essential for the 'promotion of that morality and piety
without which social happiness can not exist nor the blessings of a free government be enjoyed. ",57 The centrist position was the dominant one in the
ideology of the Founding Fathers. 58 From the beginning of the jurisprudence
of the Free Exercise Clause, it is this position that came to dominate the
ideology and thinking of the courts. 59 A slightly different view of the origins
and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause has been articulated by Vine DeLoria, Jr., who noted: "'Religion' in the original sense of the Constitution
means the various Christian denominations, whose members and clergy had
been active in religious persecution in Europe and who might, given some
authority, repeat their tyranny in America. The First Amendment was designed to keep Christians from killing each other."6O One hundred years
earlier, De Tocqueville expressed a somewhat similar sentiment:
In the United States, the influence of religion is not confmed to the
manners, but it extends to the intelligence of the' people. Among the
Anglo-Americans some profess the doctrines of Christianity from a
sincere belief in them, and others who do the same because they are

54. In 1778, William Tennet, a Presbyterian minister complained to the South Carolina
legislature that current laws favored the Church of England to the detriment of other
Christian religions and violated both principles of religious liberty and equality. However,
when he was told that the legislature was "considering a mUltiple establishment that might
include many 'orthodox' Christian groups, including his own, he found a new meaning for
equality. [Then] he supported the multiple establishment bill, because 'it opens the door
to the equal incorporation of all denominations' and to a new, more creative relationship in
which 'Christianity itselfis the established religion of the State. '" BUTLER, supra note 40,
at 260 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55. ld. at 264. The debate on Virginia'S "Bill Concerning Religion" was a touchstone
for the various positions across the spectrum.
56. ld.
57. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 27 (citation omitted).
58. ld. at 26. See for example, the Carroll family (devout Roman Catholics-then a
"minority" religion among the Founding Fathers but which fell within the rubric of Christianity, the dominant religious ideology). Charles Carroll was a signer of the Declaration
of Independence and was on the drafting committee of the First Amendment, and Daniel
Carroll signed the Constitution and advocated religious freedom. ld. at 27. John Carroll
became the first American Roman Catholic Bishop and urged toleration towards other
Christians. ld. at 27 (emphasis added).
59. Ironically, however, it has been noted that only about ten percent of "the generation
which produced the Constitution" were church members (as contrasted with approximately
two-thirds oftoday's popUlation). SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2.
60. VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF
SCIENTIFIC FACT 27 (1995).
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afraid to be suspected of unbelief. Christianity, therefore, reigns to
be without any obstacle, by universal consent; the consequence is,
as I have before observed, that every principle of the moral world is
fixed and determinate ....61
The influence of the centrists continues to dominate today and is manifested in innumerable ways. What are often noted as typically American
characteristics-strong individualism and the idea of free enterprise-it has
been argued, are "nothing more than secular extensions of the Christian precepts of a personal relationship with Christ, man's dominion over the earth,
and the bringing of Good News to all peoples.,,62 The dominance wielded by
Christian ideology, specifically in Free Exercise jurisprudence, can be best
understood by briefly examining the underlying canons of Christianity especially influential in the early history of this country.
Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in.
-St. Luke 63

Christianity, like many other religions before and since, has often fostered the belief that it is the one "true" religion. However, that idea, coupled
with two other important characteristics, have created a whole greater than
its parts. The first of these two traits is the monotheistic nature of Christian
religions. The second is the inherent evangelical component of Christianity.64 When joined together these three components set the stage for the development and nurturing of a political and social culture of conversion
(voluntary or coerced), conformity, and, in many instances, intolerance, despite the language of the First Amendment. Grounded in a monotheistic
creed, the dogmatic belief in a one truth/one way, can and does result in a
rejection of the possibility that an "other" religion or belief is at least as viable or acceptable as Christianity.65
Monotheism begins with the notion that no other gods exist. 66 This
canon leads almost inevitably to rejection of other religions, which is not
found in most other religious systems. The Baha'is, for example, stress
61. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 50, at 295.
62. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at xviii. This idea of dominion over the earth will be discussed later in this Article, as this view of human versus nature runs directly counter to
earth-based, animistic beliefs. Such a view gets reflected in the jurisprudence of free exercise claims, where all or part of the basis of the claim is to protect nature.
63. 14 Luke 23:14.
64. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Mark 15:16.
65. Of course, Christianity is not the only religion susceptible to bouts of intolerance.
Rather the point is simply that one views the underlying tenets of Christianity as inherently
exclusive and exclusionary.
66. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 17 (emphasis added). "Christian conviction, by definition, was based on an infallible authority; to challenge canons or dogmas with rational arguments could be construed by true believers as heresy." Id. at 6.
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ideas of brotherhood and generally accept the validity of all faiths, and Buddhists generally do not see conflicts between most of their teachings and
other religions. 67 For Africans and Native Americans in early America, the
Christian God that was presented to them was simply one deity, as feasible
as any other. However, the reverse did not apply, especially because of the
exclusionary nature of monotheism. Red Jacket, a Seneca chief, once asked
a Christian missionary, "If there is but one religion, why do you white people differ so much about it ?,,68 Furthermore, when the missionary aspect of
Christianity is considered,69 the inevitable result is religious imperialism.
The enslaved Africans brought to this continent, as well as the indigenous
peoples already living here, learned this lesson better than anyone. 70
From the earliest exploration of the "New World," a religious component accompanied the economic incentives of "discovery" and conquest. 71
The charters that King James granted to the Virginia companies in 1606
explicitly required "propagating the Christian religion,,,72 and the charter for
the Massachusetts Bay Company contained a comparable mandate to teach
and convert the Indians. 73 Five other charters also contained missionary
components. 74 Significantly, the motivation and compulsion to convert, and
thereby "uplift non-believers," could be traced as easily to those who professed to do it out of love and compassion, as to those who feared and disdained Indians and Africans. 75
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13 (citing DAVID T. BAILEY, SHADOW OF THE CHURCH 65 (1985».
69. The historian Forrest Wood cites Christ's mandate, found in Matthew 28:19 ("to
teach all nations") as one example that has been (and for some still remains) not only a
justification, but in fact a requirement to evangelize others in the Christian religion. Id. at
10.
70. A thorough discussion of the extent of and damage to both peoples by conquest and
evangelization is well beyond the scope of this paper. See BUTLER, supra note 40; F.
WOOD, supra note 49. The latter book focuses specifically on the effects of Christianity on
Africans.
71. See Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence o/Christian Nationalism In Federal Indian
Law: The Doctrine 0/ Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y. U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303 (1993).
72. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 18.
73. "Reviewing the charter ... King Charles considered the conversion of the heathen
natives to Christianity to be 'the principall Ende of this plantacion. '" Id.
74. The charters were for Maryland, Maine, Carolina, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.
"[O]nly those for Connecticut (1662) and New York (1664 and 1674) were silent on the
question of missions to the heathens." Id. at 19. However, Forrest Wood notes that the
mandate in these charters to convert the Indians was often ignored or supplanted by the
tendency simply to conquer· and dominate, which he asserts derived from a need to feel
safe in the new surroundings. Id. at 19-20. A more likely interpretation, perhaps, was the
expediency of conquest versus conversion.
75. Quaker critics of slavery, such as Anthony Benezet, demonstrate this point. Benezet
viewed Christianity as the means by which the Africans could overcome "the corruption of
the human heart ... ," it being "the only hope for oppressed black people everywhere." Id.
at 21. John Eliot and Cotton Mather both urged slaveholders to allow the conversion of
their slaves, Eliot arguing that it was the owners' Christian duty to do so. LoRENZO
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Thus, from the earliest days of this nation, an unassailable presumption
of the absolute rightness, and therefore supremacy, of Christianity over other
religions has existed. It is within this historical and cultural context that the
jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause developed.

PART II: THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
Although time and experience have helped American jurisprudence inch
forward somewhat, to a slightly more inclusive perspective, compulsory
unification of opinion only achieves the unanimity of the graveyard. 76 However, the framework of viewing religion has traditionally been and remains,
albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, inexorably enmeshed in a JudeoChristian weltanschauung that inherently disadvantages those religions and
religious beliefs outside that view. According to the Supreme Court,
[n]ational unity is the basis for national security. . .. The ultimate
foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and
spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people,
transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that
continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. 77
There has been some progression away from the explicit, "this is a
Christian nation,,78 view articulated by Justice Brewer, but the march away
from such a proclamation has been carried out with deliberate sluggishness.
The destination, a more vibrant, meaningful, and inclusive view of religion
that protects equally the free exercise rights of all, has yet to be reached.
A.

IN THE BEGINNING

In the early cases, the issue of religion arose less in the area of free exercise than in areas such as bequests, oaths, and disposition of property. 79
JOHNSTON GREENE, NEGROES IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 257,263,265 (1969) (discussing
Mather's assertions that the Christian mandate to love one's neighbor extended to slaves).
See also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106, 1132 (1994).
76. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Three years
after Gobitis, on virtually the same issue, the Court reversed itself, by a vote of 6-3. In the
three years between the cases, Jehovah's Witnesses had been attacked by mobs all over the
country. "The Court handed down its decision [in Gobitis] on June 3, 1940. Between
June 12 and June 20, hundreds of physical attacks upon Witnesses were reported to the
United States Department of Justice. BARBARA GRIWTTI HARRISON, VISIONS OF GLORY: A
HISTORY AND A MEMORY OF JEROVAH'S WITNESSES 190 (1978).
77. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (upholding the expulsion of two Jehovah's Witness children from public school and the subsequent arrest of
their father for the children's failure to salute the flag).
78. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892).
79. A review of the earliest religion cases before the U.S. Supreme Court shows that the
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Nonetheless, the stark and virtually unassailable notions of a monotheistic,
distinct, Christian80 perspective run rampant. A number of assumptions underlie any discussions of these cases. The starting point in almost any case
where religion was an issue was that, of course, everyone was religious,
followed closely by the assumption that the religion practiced was of Christian origin.81 While some of the language, in some of the discussions, acknowledged the existence of religions other than Christianity, the overall effect equaled little more than lip service. Even in those cases with a "liberal"
result, i.e., upholding some semblance of religious freedom, the underlying
attitude was one of exclusion and noblesse oblige. A review of some of
these early cases amply demonstrates these points.
In People v. Ruggles,82 a New York court upheld a conviction of blasphemy, rejecting the defendant's argument that the crime was not punishable
in that jurisdiction. The defendant had admitted that his words 83 were punishable under English common law, but not under state law, because New
84
York had not made Christianity part of its common law.
The court rejected all of the defendant's arguments for several different, although interconnected, reasons. The words of the defendant, which had, according to the
court, "scandalized" the "author of' Christianity, constituted a "gross violation of decency and good order,,,85 in addition to being impious. 86 This interplay between Christian religion and morality, the pervasive and eternal
marriage of concepts in American life, was explicitly acknowledged by the
court when it noted, "Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of
the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to
declare such profanity lawful. It would go to confound all distinction between things sacred and profane. ,,87 The court went on to note that the deCourt was almost exclusively dealing with property issues. See Carl H. Esbeck, Table of
United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious Liberty 1789-1994, 10 J.L.
& RELIGION 573 (1994).
80. I use the word distinct here, because, to paraphrase Orwell, some Christian religions
were more equal than others. Michael McConnell has identified several different approaches to the church-state relationship in colonial times. For example, one such attitude
was developed by the Puritans, who rejected the idea of religious pluralism (toleration
made the world anti-Christian). McConnell, supra note 10, at 1422. A second approach
was that of the Anglicans. Such congregations were established by the Crown and were
both financed and controlled by it. Id. at 1423. When non-Anglicans eventually ventured
into these communities, they were met with opposition. Id.
81. Of course, the opposite assumption was made as to "the others"-Indians and Africans. For the courts, it was axiomatic that both groups were not religious, that they did not
believe in a Christian god, which was, for the courts, the same thing.
82. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (1811).
83. The charge against the defendant was that he had "wickedly, maliciously and blasphemously" said, "in the presence and hearing of divers good and christian people," several highly derogatory remarks about Christ and his mother. Id.
84. Id. at 293-94.
85. Id. at 293.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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fendant's words also clearly went against the religion and religious beliefs of
"almost the whole community,,,88 and were, therefore, an abuse of the right
to a "free, equal and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion. ,,89 The
opinion was an absolute rejection of two principles typically thought to be
held dear in American jurisprudence and American life: the right to free
speech and the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs. But the right
to believe, under the Ruggles analysis, is permissible only as long as the
"non-believer" says or does nothing that offends the majority, a hollow right
indeed. 9O This interpretation is not an exaggeration of the reasoning, as the
court went on to make clear, that non-Christian religions were not equally
protected.
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some
have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of
the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes
that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon doctrines or worship of those impostors. Besides, the offense is crimen malitioe, and
the imputation of malice could not be inferred from any invectives
upon superstitions equally false and unknown. 91
It was only the elevated moral sense of Christians, then, that would be protected,92 at least under the New York court's analysis.
Finally, the court held that although the Constitution was religion-free, it
did not automatically follow that common law "barriers against licentious,
wanton and impious attacks upon christianity',93 had been abandoned. In
doing so, it also found that certain Christian values had clearly been incorporated into the law, citing a statute against immorality which recognized
the sanctity of the sabbath day, clearly a principle founded in Christian doctrine. 94 Thus, the court upheld the blasphemy charge as going against the
morality, religious beliefs, and common law of the community, essentially
asserting that the three were one and the same. This last point is perhaps the
most telling for what it reveals. Despite a state, or indeed, a federal constitution that had sound historical reasons for both attempting to protect relig88. [d. at 294.
89. [d.
90. This is, of course, an anathema to the principles articulated by people such as Jefferson, Franklin and Paine. See generally ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 21-31.
91. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 293.
92. "It is sufficient that the common law checks upon words and actions, dangerous to
the public welfare, ... are suited to the conditions of this and every other people whose
manners are refined, and whose morals have been elevated and inspired with a more enlarged benevolence, by means of the Christian religion." [d. at 293.
93. [d.
94. [d. at 297.
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ious liberty, and preventing the establishment of anyone religion over another, courts often act on what they assert constitutes the common thread of
"the community": its mores, standards and beliefs. However, the community, more often than not, is defmed by those very same courts, and typically
means "others like me." This reasoning, which is implicitly if not explicitly
reflected in the case law, is circular. Although a court generally states that
its reasoning and opinion is simply reflecting a communal "agreement" as to
morality and beliefs, it is instead defining and limiting that community. It
does so by selecting those values, morals, and beliefs that it has decided are
the ones that represent the totality of the community. In doing so, it inherently ignores, and therefore excludes, all others. Consciously or not, the
world reflected, discussed and upheld is a narrow one not genuinely reflective of the larger society. This was as true in 1811 New York as it is today.
In 1844, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Vidal v. Girard's Executors,95 had one of its fIrst opportunities to consider the question
of religion, albeit not on a specifIc First Amendment issue. Vidal concerned
a bequest to the City of Philadelphia that sought to establish a college for
orphans. 96 A critical issue in the bequest, however, was the following language:
Secondly, I enjoin and require that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or
minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said college; nor shall any person ever
be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said college. 97
One of the arguments made in the challenge to the will was that such a
request was "antichristian. ,,98 As such, it was argued, the will violated
Pennsylvania law. 99 However, the Court upheld the will, including the
"antichristian" aspect of the bequest. loo The Court fIrst noted that Girard's
clear intention in making his bequest was to help "the orphan poor of all
sects, Jews as well as Christians, and those who had no religion at all.,,101
However, the Court's comfort with that broad-based intent seemed to rest
95. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). There were a number of other
cases heard by the Court, but the religious "question" was not as central to the case, and
will therefore not be discussed here. See e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43
(1815) (state prohibited from expropriating property of Episcopal Church); Permoli v. First
Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (Bill of Rights not a protection for state citizens); Goesele v. Bimeler, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 589 (1852) (heirs' recovery of property from
Society of Separatists). Esbeck, supra note 79, at 1.
96. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
97. Id. at 132.
98. Id. at 143. There were other grounds for challenging the will not relevant to this
discussion.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 153.
101. Id.
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less on an open-armed embrace of "all," than on an underlying assumption
that the Court appeared to superimpose onto Girard's bequest. First, the
Court acknowledged the difficulty of furthering the goals espoused in the deceased's will, in particular the fostering of morality, if the college were to
specifically establish or require only one religious perspective. 102 But then,
in an approach which seems to mimic that of the Ruggles court, the Vidal
court held that "morality" could have only one possible definition and origin.
The Court, in discussing this question, said:
The purest principles of morality are to be taught. Where are they
found? Whoever searches for them must go to the source from
which a Christian man derives his faith-the Bible. It is therefore
affrrmatively recommended, and in such a way as to preserve the
sacred rights of conscience. No one can say that Girard was a deist. 103
The Court's comfort with Girard's bequest derived from the absolute
certainty that "morality" was virtually interchangeable with Christian doctrine, not from an acceptance of a potentially "antichristian" bequest. This
perspective is equally reflected in Holy Trinity Church v. United States. 104
Holy Trinity is, of course, where the Supreme Court declared, "We are a
Christian people. ,,105 There, the Court would not concede that a statute
which prohibited the importation of labor could, in any way, have been
meant to apply to a clergyman. While the Court first discussed religion in
102. Id. "Girard did what was in conformity with law, and often done practically. He
had to abandon his scheme or prevent discord by adopting the plan which he followed."
Id.
103. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). There is an obvious irony in reading the almost
palpable scorn with which the Court used the term deist, forgetting, of course, that Thomas
Jefferson, for example, a man vital to the life of the Constitution, was one. This change in
attitude, a dogmatism regarding religion, contributed to the despair experienced by men
such as John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson, at the end of their lives.
John Adams, like Thomas Jefferson, bemoaned the religious revivals which the country
was experiencing in the very late 1700s and early 1800s. "Superstition and bigotry, with
which Jefferson identified organized religion, were reviving, released by the democratic
revolution he had led." G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 367. John Adams asked: "Where is
now, the progress of the human Mind? ... When? Where? and How? is the present Chaos
to be arranged into Order?" Id. at 366-67. Alexander Hamilton noted, "[t]his American
world was not made for me." Id. at 367. Vidal, in its assumptions about the unquestioned
"rightness" of Christianity and Christian morality, exemplified the change in American life
that took place in less than a hundred years.
104. Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
105. Id. at 471. The case arose from a challenge to an anti-immigrant statute, which
prohibited the importation of foreign labor. Id. at 463. Holy Trinity, in New York City,
had contracted with an English clergyman to come and serve as its pastor. Id. at 458. The
government sought to exclude the minister under the statute, and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's upholding of the exclusion. The Court's opinion generally reflects
a xenophobia and anti-laborer stance which is also supported in the legislative history of
the Act. See id. at 464-66.
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general terms, ("this is a religious people"),I06 the bulk of the case makes
clear that, for the Court (presumably speaking for "the people" generally),107
religion and Christianity are one and the same. 108
The presumption of unanimity of belief is also reflected in Church of
Latter Day Saints v. United States,t09 one of several early cases involving
the Mormon Church. In Latter Day Saints, the question was the validity of
Congress's revocation of the charter of the Mormon Church, as well as the
forfeiture of church property. The Court upheld the revocation as being
within the powers of Congress. 110 In the context of discussing the disposition of Church property, the Court examined the corporation which held title. It noted that the purposes of the corporation focused on spreading the
doctrines of the Mormon Church, including. The Court's discussion of this
practice is filled with scorn and revulsion. It called polygamy "abhorrent to
the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world . . . " and a "barbarous
practice" which was "a blot on our civilization." 11 I So although Mormonism
is Christian in origin, in the early days of its existence it was sufficiently
"distinctive" from other Christian religions (in the view of the Court) to justify numerous rulings against the Church as an institution, as well as against
early religious practices, specifically polygamy. I12
While the "anti-Mormon" cases would appear, on their face, to contradict the thesis of this Article, i.e., that courts generally support Christian religious claims and go against non-Christian belief systems or ways of life, in
fact the opposite is true. Courts' early biases against the Mormons were
centered upon an absolute rejection of the practice o(polygamy: "a return
to barbarism," as the Court described it in Church of Latter Day Saints. 113

106. Id. at 465.
107. After reviewing numerous state constitutions, the Court declared: "There is no dissonance in these declaration ... , These are not individual sayings, declarations of private
persons. They are organic utterances. They speak the voice 0/ the entire people." Id. at
470 (emphasis added).
108. In hypothesizing about an Act that would have specifically excluded a church from
contracting with a clergyman to come to this country, the Court does include a synagogue
and rabbi in its speCUlative fact pattern. Id. at 472. Overall, however, the Court generally
exhibits a decidedly Christian bent throughout the case.
109. Church of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I (1890).
110. Id. at 62,65.
Ill. Id. at 48-49. In the opinion, the Court almost visibly recoils at the term polygamy.
Whatever one thinks about the practice of polygamy, it hardly seems equal to the response
it elicited from the Court in this case, or in others, or from the government, generally. It is
one thing to hold a certain practice illegal, or even simply unprotected by the law; it is another to treat it as if it is a manifestation of all that is evil and wrong in the world.
112. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding conviction of
polygamy where a requested jury instruction regarding polygamy as protected religious belief was rejected); Davis v. Beeson, 133 U.S. 333 (1889) (affirming guilty verdict for man
who, as member of Mormon Church, violated voter registration oath which required rejection of bigamy or polygamy).
113. Church o/Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49.
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The Court there added: "It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and of
the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western world. ,,114
Kurt Lash has noted that the impetus behind a bill to punish and prevent the
practice of polygamy emanated from the idea that "it was a direct affront to
the religious beliefs of the majority. ,,115 This is consistent with a literalist
view of monotheism which, as discussed above, requires a rejection of the
"other." That does not, as these cases demonstrate, simply mean a rejection
of other gods, but other beliefs, ideas and practices different from or inconsistent with a very clearly delineated view of Christianity. That view, already on display in the Mormon cases, takes on an equally narrow, and even
greater exclusionary bent in Native American and other animist, earth-based
contexts.
B. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STREET
If the courts were specifically setting out the inherent Christian character of the United States, they were also implicitly, when not explicitly, sanctioning the dismantling of various non-Christian religions. This is best evidenced by examining the treatment of the two groups of peoples most
profoundly affected by the Christianization that took place in early America:
the Africans brought to the United States in the slave trade and Native
Americans.

1. The Africans
The religious status of Africans brought to the United States in the earliest days of this country was complicated by "that peculiar institution." The
Puritans thought, for example, that slavery was "a means of bringing the
heathen to ChriSt.,,1l6 Slavery was originally justified in part by a bias
against "heathens" and unbelievers. 117 Although eventually that general bias
transformed into a specific bias against race, which made it easier to justify
the practice, for a long while the institution of slavery posed a dilemma for
Christian slaveowners. 118 How could one reconcile one's own Christian beliefs, and the mandate to bring the opportunity of salvation through conversion to the heathens, while maintaining the institution of slavery? In the
early days of colonialism and slavery, conversion of slaves was discouraged,
in part on economic grounds. 119 There was an inherent contradiction in both
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Lash, supra note 75, at 1124.
116. GREENE, supra note 75, at 257.
117. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 129.
118. Id. at 129.
119. GREENE, supra note 75, at 257-58. "Many owners feared conversion might lessen
the value of their chattels as laborers. Not only would valuable time be lost in instructing
them, but, once converted, the Negroes would be compelled to attend church on Sunday.
Prohibition of Sunday work by the slaves would increase maintenance costs, for in the
plantation colonies, especially, the slaves raised part of their food on that day." [d. at 258
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baptizing and admitting Africans into white churches, while simultaneously
enslaving them. 120 Slaveowners feared that Christian concepts of equality
would plant dangerous ideas in slaves' minds. They also feared that since
only heathens could be enslaved, conversion would eliminate a critical justification for slavery. 121 That incongruity was most often dealt with by ensuring legislatively that baptism did not confer manumission. 122 F or example,
six colonies passed such laws in the late seventeenth century through the
beginning of the eighteenth century.123
In New England, there was less resistance to the idea of converting
slaves than in the South, in part due to efforts by the British "to spread the
Protestant faith by competing with the Catholics in the conversion of Indians
and Negroes.,,124 Cotton Mather became an ardent advocate of Christianizing slaves, reconciling their conversion with the maintenance of the system
of slavery by noting: "What law is it, that sets the baptized slave at liberty?
Not the law o!Christianity.,,125 The Quakers, many of whom owned slaves
until 1773, when they forbade members from doing so, also favored Christianization of slaves. 126 These motivations and ideas took on even greater
momentum with the coming of the first Great Awakening, which spread a
religious fervor throughout the colonies. 127
What ultimately occurred then, as historian Jon Butler has noted, was a
parallel growth in both Christianity and slavery in the colonies after 1680. 128
That expansion of Christianity and slavery in the colonies led to what Butler
classifies as "the single most important religious transformation to occur in
the American colonies before 1776: an African spiritual holocaust that forever destroyed traditional African religious systems as systems in North
America and that left slaves remarkably bereft of traditional collective relig-

(citation omitted).
120. GEORGE EATON SIMPSON, BLACK RELIGIONS IN THE NEW WORLD 213 (1978). It was
also true, however, that white slaveowners had a tremendous fear of the Africans congregating in their own churches, in a group setting not absolutely controlled by the slaveowner. [d. at 214. This led to numerous acts being passed which forbid owners from allowing "any Negro or Negroes to build on their ... lands ... any house under pretense of
a meetinghouse upon account of worship.... " [d. (citation omitted). See also GLADYSMARIE FRY, NIGHT RIDERS IN BLACK FOLK HISTORY 38-58 (1991).
121. GREENE, supra note 75, at 259.
122. SIMPSON, supra note 120, at 213.
123. GREENE, supra note 75, at 260. Those colonies were Maryland, Virginia, New
York, New Jersey, North and South Carolina. Id.
124. Id. at 262-63.
125. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 275.
127. GREENE, supra note 75, at 276. See also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7
(citation omitted).
128. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 149-50. He notes that while slavery existed in the colonies existed prior to 1680, it was not until that time that slavery became a viable economic
force. !d. at 130.
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ious practice before 1760.,,129 This was fueled in part by the overwhelming
success of Protestant Christianity in converting slaves, as opposed to numbers of Africans converted to Catholicism in the colonies. 130 This was important because, as has been shown in studies of slave experiences in Brazil
and the Caribbean, Spanish-enforced Catholic conversions did not eradicate
African religious traditions and beliefs in the same way that Protestant conversions did. 131 The North American, predominantly Protestant, evangelization of slaves had a devastating effect on African spiritual traditions. 132 This
was furthered by an insidious strategy devised by slave owners as a means
of slave control. Slave owners created and spread stories of the supernatural
that drew on, and were extrapolated from certain African beliefs. They
played on fears of conjuring and witchcraft for one purpose: "to discourage
the unauthorized movement of Blacks, especially at night. 133 It was used
during slavery to prevent insurrections by discouraging the assembly of
Blacks. . .. ,,134
The spiritual holocaust against Africans gave rise to a somewhat peculiar relationship between Christianity and slavery. That is, Christian tenets
and Biblical mandates were used both as support for and opposition to slavery.135 However, it should be noted that by the early nineteenth century, fear
129. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 129-30.
130. See generally GREENE, supra note 75, at 268.
131. JOSEPH M. MURPHY, SANTERiA: AN AFRICAN RELIGION IN AMERICA 27-33 (1988).
The reasons for more of a "survival" of African spiritual beliefs and practices under Spanish conversions had to do, in part, with the easily drawn analogies between Catholic saints
and their mythologies, for example, and various African deities who appeared to have
comparable characteristics. See F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 7-8 (citation omitted); MIGENE
GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, SANTERiA: AFRICAN MAGIC IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (1981).
132. This is not to suggest, however, that African beliefs and traditions did not, and have
not survived. See generally AFRlCANISMS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Joseph E. Hollowayed.,
1991). But a greater or more extensive preservation of African religious traditions and
practices occurred under Spanish Catholic rule than under Anglo-American Protestant rule.
133. One of the more devious manifestations of this strategy was the designation of the
Indian as a "devil figure." FRY, supra note 120, at 50. As Fry notes, this had particular
significance in the Eastern colonies, " ... arising mainly from the problem of troublesome
communities of runaway slaves who had settled in uninhabited areas of Southern states
and the fear of possible conspiracies between Indians and Blacks against whites. To forestall such cooperative efforts between these two groups, the whites adopted a policy of divide and conquer, in which Indians and Blacks were played off against each other. . .. "
Id.
134. Id. at 45. She notes that this method of control survived post-emancipation and was
used to keep Blacks from fleeing the rural South for the cities in the North. Id.
135. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 39-83. "Religion, therefore, was largely employed as a
device for making the slave content and submissive by his bondage. . .. This interpretation was first inculcated by Cotton Mather ... Mather's precepts set a precedent for using
the religious indoctrination of the slaves as a subtle device for slave control. . .. "
GREENE, supra note 75, at 286. It should not have come as much of a surprise, then, when
Alabama State Senator Charles Davidson distributed a written copy of a speech recently,
which cited Biblical support for slavery. Indeed, not only did his speech cite several specific Biblical references, Davidson went on to assert that a benefit of slavery was that
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of slave uprisings came to outweigh any sense of obligation regarding
Christian instruction. 136 Such instruction was seen as fomenting "selfassertive tendencies.,,137 Nonetheless, conversion had already taken hold almost systematically throughout the African population, with its effects lasting through the present day. This may explain why, generally speaking, free
exercise claims of non-Judeo-Christian religions arise largely, but not exclusively, in the context of Native American religious beliefs rather than in
the context of African religious traditions. 138
The indelible transformation of the spiritual traditions and beliefs of the
African populations in early America did not occur in the same way, nor to
the same effect in the indigenous populations. Christianity came later in
time to many Native Americans and lasted longer (the missionizing and government prohibitions against Indian religious practices continued through the
latter part of the nineteenth century).139 Unlike the slave populations, Indians were much more geographically dispersed across this continent. As
such, different measures were required for the forced conversions of Native
Americans. 140
Blacks got converted to Christianity. '''I'm sure that those converted black Southerners are
most grateful today,' he wrote." ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 10, 1996, at Cll.
136. In 1800, there was the Gabriel conspiracy, in 1822, Denmark Vesey's aborted attempt at an uprising; and in 1831, the Nat Turner rebellion. FRY, supra note 120, at 3940. Ironically, all three men, especially Nat Turner, were devout Christians. "Vesey was
also a devoted student of the Bible and frequently quoted passages from it to support his
argument that slavery was contrary to the laws of God .... " Id. at 42.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Of course, Church of Lukumi Babalu-Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) is one of several exceptions, as is Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N. Y.
1994), where inmates, practitioners of Santeria were prohibited from wearing Orisa beads.
Their beads had been confiscated by prison officials and they sought a return of the beads
and the right to wear them. The court granted the plaintiffs' injunction on free exercise
grounds. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 197. See also Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568
(S.D.N. Y. 1995), where Rastafarian correctional officers sought protection from regulations which would have required them to cut their dreadlocks. They argued that both the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and state and federal free exercise claims guaranteed
them the right to refrain from cutting their hair. The federal district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Id. at 580.
139. See Russell Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedomfor Indigenous Americans, 65
OR. L. REv. 363, 369-74 (1986). Barsh notes that in 1882, dances and feasts were suppressed. Id. at 370. In 1884, violations of that policy resulted in imprisonment. Id. at 370
n.44 (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, DEP'T OF INTERIOR REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN DEP'T
496-97 (1884), which also punished "holding oneself out as a 'medicine-man "').
140. NATIVE AMERICANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (Fremont J. Lyden & Lyman H. Letgers
eds., 1992). I wish to note here that this Article cannot, and does not pretend to do justice
to the stories of either the Africans brought to this continent as slaves, or the Native
American settler history and experiences, or American expansionism. I merely seek, here,
to introduce some basic historical experiences as a necessary component to discussing, in
context, the difficulties of applying a Judeo-Christian framework to non-monotheistic belief systems. That must, and does, include characteristics and values that emanate from
those differing belief systems. Such values manifest in numerous ways including, as I argue throughout this Article, in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause.
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2. Native Americans
The motivation for the Christianization of Native Americans rested, in
part, on the general view that Indians, like African slaves, were "heathens"
and Christian dogma required evangelization. 141 However, the overriding
American demand and passion for the ownership and exclusive control of
land had as much or more to do with efforts to Christianize Native Americans than did purely ethnocentric notions of superiority.142 This demand
grew greater by the beginning of the nineteenth century and led to the
"Removal Era." Within that era, the movement to convert and "uplift" the
Indians took on greater momentum.
The assimiliationist movement grew in tandem with the policy of
removal. Thomas Jefferson was one of the major supporters of the
view that with adequate resources and coaxing Indians could be
"civilized" and live in harmony with their white neighbors. . .. Indians were seen as being "historically anterior and morally inferior"
to Protestant Christian settlers, and with expectations of their demise as a people, there was pressure to civilize and Christianize
them before it was too late. 143
Thus, the government created the Civilization Fund, whereby Congress
established an annual appropriation, the sole purpose of which was to fund
missionary efforts for Christianizing the Indians. l44 Government support for
and American policy regarding the Christianization of Indians, however, began before the Civilization Fund of 1819. F or example, George Washington, in his Third Annual Message in 1791, articulates the necessary elements
of an Indian policy, stating that a "system corresponding with the mild principles of religion and philanthropy toward an unenlightened race of men,
whose happiness materially depends on the conduct of the United States,
would be as honorable to the national character as conformable to the dictates of sound policy.,,145 These notions of bringing "enlightenment" to the
141. For a discussion of the idea of evangelization as an inherent component of Christian
tenets, see supra notes 52-54, 64 and accompanying text.
142. The desire and demand for more and more land generally superseded all other interests vis a vis the Indians. The numerous Indian Removal Acts best exemplifY this lust.
See, e.g., MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT MONROE ON INDIAN REMOVAL (1825); reprinted in
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DocUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 39 (2d ed. 1990).
See also SECRETARY OF WAR EATON ON CHEROKEE REMOVAL (1829), reprinted in PRUCHA,
supra at 44; PRESIDENT JACKSON ON INDIAN REMOVAL 47 (1829), reprinted in PRUCHA, supra at 47; THE INDIAN REMOVAL ACT OF 1830, reprinted in PRUCHA, supra at 52.
143. PRUCHA, supra note 142, at 20.
144. Id. "Be it enacted . .. , [t]hat for the purpose of providing against the further decline and final extinction of the Indian tribes, . . . and for introducing among them the
habits and arts of civilization .... " CIVILIZATION FUND ACT (1819), reprinted in Prucha,
supra note 142, at 33.
145. PRESIDENT WASlllNGTON'S THIRD ANNuAL MESSAGE, reprinted in PRUCHA, supra
note 142, at 15.
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non-Christians continued through the nineteenth century, as Indian Commissioner Hiram Price's Annual Report of 1882 indicates:
One very important auxiliary in transforming men from savage to
civilized life is the influence brought to bear upon them through the
labors of Christian men and women as educators and missionaries.
This, I think, has been forcibly illustrated and clearly demonstrated
among the different Indian tribes by the missionary labors of the
various religious societies in the last few years. Civilization is a
plant of exceedingly slow growth, unless supplemented by Christian
teaching and influences. . .. If we expect to stop sun dances, snake
worship, and other debasing forms of superstition and idolatry
among Indians, we must teach them some better way. 146
As in earlier times, the belief that Christianization was the only means of

civilization147 and progress was shared and propagated by both anti-Indian
officials, such as Andrew Jackson, and reformers. Some of these reformers
met annually between 1883 and 1916, and were influential in the creation of
federal policy towards Indians. In a report from their 1884 meeting, the reformers noted how critical education (which for Indians generally meant
mission schools) was to this process:

Resolved, That education is essential to civilization . . .. [The Indian] must have a Christian education to enable him to perform the
duties of the family, the State, and the Church. Such an education
can be best acquired apart from his reservation and amid the influences of Christian and civilized society . .. The Christian people of
the country should exert through the Indian schools a strong and
moral and religious influence. 148
These ideas and policies continued well into the twentieth century. In
the 1920s, for example, the United States government continued to ban any
Indian dances or feasts, and Indian children were forcibly removed from
their families and sent to boarding schools, where church service was mandatory.149 The official right to religious "freedom" did not come until
1978. 150
146. ANNUAL REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1992), reprinted in
PRUCHA, supra note 142, at 157-59. Prucha notes that Indian Commissioner Price was a
noted Methodist layman. [d. at 157.
147. The writings and discussions regarding "civilizing the heathen" (African or Indian)
remind me of graffiti I saw long ago, painted on the side of a building in New York City.
It read: "Q: Mr. Gandhi, what do you think of Western civilization?" Gandhi: "I think it
would be a good idea."
148. PROGRAM OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE (1884), reprinted in PRUCHA, supra
note 142, at 163-64.
149. Barsh, supra note 139, at 371.
150. 42 U.S.c. § 1996 (1978).
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What this cursory review of American policy towards Africans and Indians makes clear is that there was a persistent ideological assumption that
Christianity, both as a religion and a culture, was superior to all other various and disparate religions, and was the only acceptable foundation for a
uniform, American culture. It followed, therefore, that there should be one,
homogenous American culture ("the melting pot"), to the virtual exclusion
of all else, especially to that which did not have European, Judeo-Christian
origins.
C. WEAREALLRELATED 151

Christians believe that God is separate from humanity and does as
he wishes without the creative assistance of any of his creatures,
while the non-Christian tribal person assumes a place in creation
that is dynamic, creative, and responsive. Further, tribal people allow all animals, vegetables, and minerals... the same or even
greater privileges than humans. The Indian participates in destiny
on all levels, including that of creation.... [E]ven the All Spirit. ..
has limited power as well as a sense of proportion and respect for
the powers of the creatures. Contrast this spirit with the JudeoChristian God, who makes everything and tells everything how it
may and may not function if it is to gain his respect and
' .... 152
bl essmg
A meaningful discussion of Native American and other earth-based religions 153 and practices is immediately complicated not merely by semantics,
but by a view of life 154 that encompasses not one's place in the universe, but

151. "'We are all related' is a statement of profound implications made by each Lakota
after he or she has smoked a sacred pipe in common and in communion." JOSEPH E.
BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 13 (1982).
152. PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN
INDIAN TRADITIONS 56-57 (1986).
153. I recognize that I am engaging in generalizations here and in other sections of this
Article about an "Indian" or "earth-based" religion, as if there were one. Indeed, it is precisely the inherent individual co-relationship between a person and all other living beings
(who are defined very broadly) that lies at the root of such religious beliefs. However, in
order to discuss the thread of bias in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause, I feel
compelled to use this "shorthand" terminology. But I should not be understood to suggest
that there is one such religion. Many people who practice Santeria, for example, are also
practicing Catholics. The pervasiveness of Christian missionizing among Indians has had
an effect on Indians and Indian religions as well. Many Indians, for example, may pray
with a sacred pipe and be practicing Christians. There is nothing inherently problematic
with that. Black Elk, the great Lakota holy man, was a Christian. THOMAS E. MAILS,
FOOLS CROW 45 (1979). It is the flexibility of these earth based religions ("all roads are
good") that allows for this, while monotheism generally rejects it.
154. "American Indian thought makes no such dualistic division, nor does it draw a hard
and fast line between what is material and what is spiritual, for it regards the two as different expressions of the same reality." ALLEN, supra note 152, at 60.
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one's place with and as a part of the universe. 155 That is a markedly different perspective than a religious ideology that places people above nature.
"That which we refer to in current usage as 'religion' cannot be conceived as
being separable from any of the multiple aspects of any American Indian
culture." I 56 This is a fundamental divergence from religious beliefs which
compartmentalize people, animals and nature as separate entities within a
specified hierarchical order.
How you live life is both an art and a religion, as is how you treat
and respect the environment-including animals, plants and fellow
humans--alllife forms, even our Mother Earth. We see no need to
create concepts to separate or fragment our daily lives. You need
not have to go to church and pray when your home and environment
are your church, your place of prayers. Try to live a clean, beautiful, good, and balanced life. Be generous and caring. That's what
our elders tell us.
-Conrad House l57
The persistent use and application of traditionally Judeo-Christian
theoiogical I58 terms to such beliefs and concepts perpetuates a system that
will not comprehend "the other" and therefore results in the denial of religious freedom for entire ways of being. As Joseph Epes Brown has explained, when viewed from within a monotheistic religious perspective, there
are only two, mutually exclusive variations; religions are either monotheistic
or they are polytheistic. I59 This is inherently wrong~ he argues, because
"primitive religions" (Brown's term), such as Indian religious traditions, do
not fall into this explicit duality. He asserts that instead, such religions actually fall into a general category of theism that draws on both. 160 This dual155. This is also true of other "earth-based," "polytheistic," "animistic" "belief systems,"
such as Candomble or Santeria, for example. I use quotation marks around these words,
because this terminology, I believe, does not do justice to the beliefs and knowledge these
religions encompass. Rather, they are terms that are derived from a language which emanates from Judeo-Christian perspectives. Perhaps it is in the recognition of such limitations that a seed of change is planted.
156. BROWN, supra note 151, at 2.
157. ALL ROADS ARE GooD, supra note 1, at 91.
158. My language here is somewhat awkward, but words and ideas grounded in theology
do not work well when taken outside of their Judeo-Christian context. Of course, that is
exactly what has almost always occurred in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause,
and is the point of this Article. Words reflect concepts, and therefore the choice of words
carries tremendous weight and influence. Furthermore, he/she who gets to choose the
words gets to define and control both the discussion and the results.
159. BROWN, supra note 151, at 69-70. Brown has also noted that monotheism is the one
generally recognized as a sign of progress and civilization. Id.
160. Id. at 70. For example, he cites the Lakota and Dakota of the Plains, for whom
"Wakan-Tanka, Great Mysterious, is an all-inclusive concept that refers both to a Supreme
Being and to the totality of all gods or spirits or powers of creation." Id. (emphasis
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istic view is a far cry from a cultural view that, more often than not, tends to
see things as an either/or proposition.
One must resist the tendency to think of non-Christian religions as
simply faiths in which people worship other deities or apotheosize
different messengers. The theologies and eschatologies of Native
American, African, and Eastern religions are so fundamentally different from the Judeo-Christian belief system that the word
"religion" often seems inadequate to identify them ... how poorly
the word "religion" describes the beliefs of other peoples when we
try to understand them according to the monotheistic model. .... 161
Rather, one must move away from a linear perspective to a circular one,
in order to better understand how both earth based religious perspectives differ, and how they inform every aspect of one's life. The circle is "cyclical
and reciprocal.,,162 In order to draw a representational figure of a hierarchical relationship, one must use straight lines. But it is not possible to draw a
hierarchy by using a circle. Herein lies a critical difference in the perspectives I am discussing, and this conflict is reflected in the realm of free exercise law.
There are three essential points of conflict between Judeo-Christian
theological perspectives and earth-based ones. It is critical to identify and
describe them in order to recognize how they impact a court's examination
of a free exercise claim arising from a religion outside of the Judeo-Christian
model. Anyone of these differences plays a role in the skewed jurisprudence
of the Free Exercise Clause. However, when they are synthesized, as they
tend to be, the legal analysis that follows is inherently slanted in an exclusionary way.
The first tension arises from the significance and value given to the
written word in Judeo-Christian religions, as opposed to religions that rely
on oral traditions. 163 The second point of departure is the view and role of
added).
161. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at xxi.
162. BROWN, supra note 151, at 4. As Brown notes, this circular perspective pervades
every aspect of life for Indians. In Santeria, there are comparable concepts. "The /fa
Creation myth teaches that all form (ire) was placed in the universe at the beginning of
time. The primal Spirit that sustains form as an element of Creation is Olodumare ....
Olodumare is similar to the Western theological concept known as pantheism; the belief
that everything in the physical universe is an expression of Deity." Awo FALOKUN
FATUNMBI, IWA-PELE, IFA QUEST: THE SEARCH FOR THE SOURCE OF SANTERiA AND LUCUMi
82 (1991).
163. This is not to suggest that Judeo-Christian religions have no oral traditions, or that
earth-based belief systems have no written traditions. However, generally speaking, those
religions which fall within or derive from Judeo-Christian origins tend to rely on and center on the written word, as manifested in the Bible, Talmud, or Koran, for example. "The
Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 199 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992) (citing WILUAM CHILLINGWORTH,
THE REUGION OF PROTESTANTS.) Many, if not most earth-based belief systems tend to con-
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women in the central tenets or beliefs of the religion. The third critical divergence arises out of the view and role of land and nature. The cases where
"other" beliefs, practices and spiritual views have been brought before the
courts cannot be fully and completely comprehended without understanding
how these three characteristics have functioned as the unidentified, unacknowledged puppeteers which have manipulated and obscured the thinking
and reasoning of the decisionmakers.
1. The Voice or the Book
Write the vision and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that
readeth it. l64
Behind naming, beneath words, is something else. An existence
named unnamed and unnameable. . . . We say the inarticulate have
no souls .... Yet for our own lives we grieve all that cannot be spoken, that there is no name for, repeating for ourselves the names of
things which surround what cannot be named. 165
In Judeo-Christian theologies, there is a disproportionate emphasis and
significance given to the written word. l66 However, in numerous other
spiritual traditions, typically earth-based ones, beliefs, ceremonies, rituals
and understandings are generally passed down orally. 167 Written text, in
fact, is often forbidden because of the specific knowledge being shared or
transmitted. 168 "Sacred knowledge can be a kind of intellectual property.
tinue as they began--in an oral tradition passed on through each generation.
164. 2 Habakkuk 2 (emphasis added).
165. SUSAN GRIFFIN BROWN, WOMAN AND NATURE 190 (1978).
166. The Bible is replete with references which support this premise. In the Islamic religion, which has the Koran as its sacred written text, Jesus is considered "the Word which
God placed into Mary." ANNE MARIE SCIllMMEL, IsLAM: .AN INTRODUCTION 73 (1992).
The Koran is considered "not the word of a prophet but the unadulterated word of
God.... " Id. at 29. Similarly, the Torah is considered to be "the Law as the will of Yahweh revealed through the priests." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3546 (Paul Kevin Meagher
et al. eds., 1979). The Vedas, in Hinduism, while not exactly analogous to the Bible, for
example, are also written sacred texts. ("The Vedas ... and other writings comprising the
sacred canon of Brahmanic Hinduism, recognized as authoritative in all orthodox Hinduism"). Id. at 3647.
167. "This history of the sacred pipe of the Sioux was handed down orally by the former
Keeper of The Sacred Pipe, Elk Head (Hehaka Pa) .... " THE SACRED PIPE: BLACK ELK'S
ACCOUNT OF THE SEVEN RITES OF THE OGLALA SIOUX xii (Joseph E. Brown ed., 1984). See
also L. ERNESTO PICHARDO, ODUDUWA OBATALA 1-2 (1984) (stating that Santeria was an
oral tradition until this century; the first writings were done in secret); ACAOOHKIWINA AND
ACIMOWINA: TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES OF THE ROCK CREE INDIANS (Robert A. Brightman
ed., 1989) (including accounts of sacred rites and rituals traditionally passed down orally
now being written down for fear they will be lost forever).
168. Russel Barsh's article is instructive in noting the Australian case of Foster v.
Mountford, 29 F.L.R. 233 (N. Terr. Sup. Ct. 1976). Barsh, supra note 139, at 391. That
case arose when members of the Pitjantjara Council (an Aboriginal group) sought to block
the publication of a book by the defendant/author Dr. Mountford. Thirty-five years earlier,
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Disclosure can destroy its sacramentality. ,,169 Additionally, as the court in
the Foster case acknowledged, not everyone is permitted to have access to
all information. 170 This becomes even more complicated when the law is
turned to for protection, because, as Barsh has pointed out, "[g]overnment
action or private litigation to protect a religious site or practice unavoidably
entails public documentation, which can destroy what is to be saved.,,171
This concept stands in complete opposition to Judeo-Christian beliefs, which
most often elevate that which is written over that which is not. I72 It also reflects a general cultural perspective regarding knowledge. That which is
written is tangible, and, therefore, knowable. While there is nothing problematic with that perspective, in and of itself, where it requires an absolute a
rejection of other possible ways of knowledge, one is left with the rejection
of any evidence, for example, derived from oral traditions. 173
This myopic approach does not work in the area of religious freedom.
The jurisprudence reflects a certain entrenched cultural predisposition to
trust only that which is documented or documentable ("scientific") and to
distrust that which is not ("intuitive," "irrational,,).174 It is ironic that this
the Pitjantjara people had taken Dr. Mountford "into their confidence, they showed him
and explained to him sacred sites and objects, paintings and rock engravings, and he recorded their myths and totemic geography by aboriginal drawings, the camera and the
notebook." Foster, 29 F.L.R. at 236. The author had even acknowledged, in his foreword,
that his book "should be used only after consultation with local male religious
leaders .... " Id. The plaintiffs argued that the revelation of this information was a breach
of confidence, and that the book revealed secrets that, the court found, if revealed to
"women, children and uninitiated men may undennine the social and religious stability of
their hard-pressed community." Id.
169. Barsh, supra note 139, at 391 (emphasis added).
170. Foster, 29 F.L.R. at 236.
171. Barsh, supra note 139, at 392.
172. "Blessed Lord, who hast caused all holy Scriptures to be written for our learning;
Grant that we may in such wise hear them, read, mark, learn.... " BOOK OF COMMON
PRAYER, reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 120 (1992) (emphasis
added). The subtext here, of course, reinforces the ideas that the "one truth," "one idea,"
"one word," inherent in monotheism, are captured in the "one" Book ("the Word," "the
Good Book"). See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
173. This approach dominates law and science. Generally, evidence labeled anecdotal,
as opposed to empirical, is dismissed or discounted. It is this view that is reflected in the
weight courts give not only to certain types of evidence, but certain witnesses. For example, in Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the plaintiffs, Navajos and Hopis,
filed suit seeking to stop the expansion of ski slopes in the San Francisco Peaks, sacred to
both tribes. The plaintiffs' affidavits asserted that the Peaks (including the pennit area)
were indispensable to their religious practices. The district court, however, rejected the
position that the pennit area was central to their religions. Id. at 745 n.7. The appellate
court upheld the decision, noting that the evidence that all of the Peaks are sacred, including the ski area that was to be expanded, "does not establish the indispensability of the
pennit area." Id. This finding seemed to mirror the testimony of two government witnesses who were experts on the Navajo and Hopi religions. Id. at 744. It would appear,
therefore, that the experts on religious beliefs and practices carried more weight in court
than did the practitioners themselves, who argued otherwise.
174. There is clearly a connection here between the negative societal views towards
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partiality has been extended to religion, given that religion, generally, turns
on, and indeed requires, faith in that which is not provable. But certain religious beliefs have become ensconced in the culture, and deference to written texts is one of them. Because monotheistic precepts require a rejection
of the other, those others, especially those others that are based on oral traditions, are labeled "supernatural," or "uncivilized" and are therefore easily
dismissed. 175 The recent uproar arising from the revelation in Bob Woodward's book, The Chosen, that Hillary Rodham Clinton had "visualized" a
conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt, is only another example of this. Even
in those articles "defending" the First Lady (including those relying on
spokespersons for the Clintons), the sneering tones with which they discussed the topic reflects a general disdain for what may in fact be the genuine religious beliefs of others. 176 Indeed, there is an arrogance in mocking
even the idea that one may communicate with spirits, (or rocks or trees, for
that matter), while not fmding it at all odd to believe in angels, a burning
bush, or a resurrection from the dead, all concepts set forth in the Bible.
However, that which cannot, or should not, be labeled or named is outside of
one's control, and thus is less palatable in an ordered, hierarchical universe. I77
women and what are traditionally described as feminine characteristics, i.e., emotion vs.
intellect or intuition vs. reason.
175. The definition for supernatural is telling: "of or caused by power above the forces of
nature." OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 923 (Eugene Ehrlich et al. eds., 1980) (emphasis
added). But in fact, others would argue that those things typically labelled "supernatural"
(spirits, for example) are not "above" nature, but simply a part of nature.
176. "Washington was titillated when Sunday's Washington Post ran ... excerpts from
'The Choice' ... that says the president's wife found encouragement by talking with Jean
Houston, co-director of the Foundation for Mind Research, which studies psychic experience." First Lady Defended on Ties to New Age Author, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at
All. Even Dr. Houston herself stated: "I'm not a psychic! I don't believe in spirits and
spooks!" Paula Span, Spirits Lifted, Not Summoned: Philosopher Jean Houston Denies
Role as First Lady's Spiritual Guide, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at Cl. She went on to
note: "Mrs. Clinton is a very committed Christian, a serious Methodist. The president is a
prayerful man." Id. Deborah Tannen, a linguistics professor who wrote a New York
Times Op-Ed piece on this issue, zeroed in on the sexism underlying the attacks on Dr.
Houston and Hillary Rodham Clinton, by comparing how differently, i.e., matter of factly,
the media report on male athletes and businesses who rely on visualization and other such
techniques to be successful. Deborah Tannen, The Guru Gap, N.Y. TIMES, at A19. But
what has gone unnoticed is why one set of beliefs (psychics, channeling, seances) is inherently ridiculous, while another (God speaking to Moses, archangels, Lot's wife turning to a
pillar of salt) is not. It is impossible to imagine a newspaper in this country discussing
these latter beliefs in any way other than respectfully, if not reverentially. I am simply
suggesting here that the media reaction is not very different from the implicit reactions and
views of many judges.
177. See GRIFFIN BROWN, supra note 165, at 51-52, 190-91. Griffin quotes Carolus Linnaeus: "The first step of science is to know one thing from another. .. but in order that it
may be fixed and permanent distinct names must be given to different things and those
names must be recorded and remembered." Id. at 146 (citation omitted). This seems to be
equally applicable to Judeo-Christian religions.
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The sin Adam and Eve committed in the Garden of Eden was attempting
to become knowledgeable. Their attempt opened the further possibility that,
with knowledge, they might become immortal. This apparently was not acceptable, not because knowledge and immortality were sinful but because
possession of them by human beings would reorder the hierarchical princi17s
ples on which the Judeo-Christian universe is posited.
Judeo-Christian religions are inherently hierarchical. Thus, those spiritual belief systems which rely on oral traditions, and which are typically
non-hierarchical and non-institutionalized, are rarely given the same recognition as a religion qua religion that a "knowable" religion is.

2. Women, Men and God(s)
This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be
called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. 179
There is a spirit that pervades everything, that is capable of powerful song and radiant movement. . .. Com Woman is one aspect of
her, and Earth Woman is another, and what they together have made
is called Creation, Earth, creatures, plants, and light. At the center
of all is Woman, and nothing is sacred. . . without her blessing, her
thinking.lS0
The role of women in Judeo-Christian theologies, versus the role or roles
in earth-based, animistic religions, is another clear point of divergence. In
Judeo-Christian theologies, women are subordinate to men, as Paul's message to the Corinthians ("the head of woman is her husband,,)lsl ... Genesis
states that God (the Father) made man in his image, and "male and female
he created them."IS2 But in numerous earth-based traditions, woman is recognized as being a creator or co-creator, a fundamentally different idea indeed. 1S3 The religious and cultural roles of and views about women vary accordingly.
In Judeo-Christian theological schemes, a woman is most often seen as
the evil temptress responsible for the downfall of man: "The woman whom
thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat."I84 Those
ideas, coupled with the notion of woman coming from the rib of Adam, when
translated into a broader culture, create a perspective of woman as "the
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

ALLEN, supra note 152, at 58.
2 Genesis 23.
ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13.
1 Corinthians 11.
1 Genesis 26, 27.
See generally THE BOOK OF THE GoDDESS PAST AND PRESENT (Carl Olsen ed., 1985);
ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13-29; GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, supra note 131, at 24-30. See also
Barsh, supra note 139, at 364-65.
184. 3 Genesis 12.
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weaker sex" whose role must, by defInition, always be subordinate to that of
man. 185 Excluding the Virgin Mary, Christianity has no woman approaching
goddess status.
However, where you have a religious system where woman is creator or
co-creator,186 you will have a society that reflects entirely different views
about women in its communities. 187 In Santeria, for example, the goddess
Yemaya (the moon goddess who also controls the water) gave forth, on her
death, to fourteen of the gods of the Yoruba people. The city where she
died, lIe Ife, became known as the holy City.188 In various Indian religions,
there are numerous women creators or co-creators, such as Spider Woman,
Hard Beings Woman, Sky Woman, Thought Woman, and White Buffalo
Woman. 189 Of course, numerous pre-Christian religions also had women
deities. 190 When women are either absent from a theology, or portrayed
negatively, over time a culture that relies on that theology also reflects the
view of women as subordinate. This makes it that much more diffIcult to
comprehend a religion that not only rejects that idea, but affIrmatively sets
out women as deities. This aggravates the existing problem of misunderstanding a religious claim that arises outside historically monotheistic religions.

3. Nature
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:
and let them have dominion over the fIsh of the sea, and over the
fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth and over
every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. 191

185. "The power of woman is her dependence, flowing from the consciousness of that
weakness which God has given her for protection. But when she assumes the place and
tone of man as public reformer ... she yields the power which God has given her for her
protection, and her character becomes unnatural ...." ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN
53 (1976) (quoting a pastoral letter from the Congregational Church sent to the Grimk6
sisters who had been speaking out publicly against slavery) (citation omitted).
186. This is not meant to refer to woman as mother. Rather, it refers to "She Who
Thinks rather than She Who Bears ... [aJ woman as creation thinker and female thought
as origin of material and nonmaterial reality. In this epistemology, the perception of female power as confined to maternity is a limit on the power inherent in femininity."
ALLEN, supra note 152, at 15.
187. For example, the Cherokee, in times of war, had a red government, which included
among its officers "Beloved, Pretty or War Women." RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE
SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 26 (1975). The Cherokee, like many other
Indian nations, was matrilineal. Id. at 22. See also ALLEN, supra note 152, at 20-32.
188. GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, supra note 131, at 26. Two of those gods propagated the human race. Id.
189. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13-17.
190. See generally THE BOOK OF THE GoDDESS PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 183.
191. 1 Genesis 26.
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Nature is sacred because it reveals ... the Great Mystery.192
I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong
193
brown go d ....
Religious views regarding written versus oral traditions, or the role of
women, take on greater significance as differences between theological perspectives, when the last critical divergence between Judeo-Christian and
earth-based religions is examined. Divergent cultural and religious views
about nature-who or what it is, why it is, and humanity's relationship to
and with it--are perhaps the single biggest impediment to just resolution of
free exercise cases involving earth-based religions. A Judeo-Christian theological view which separates, and makes man and woman "apart" from and
above nature, is entirely different from animistic religions.
In English, one can divide the universe into two parts: the natural and
the supernatural. Humanity has no real part in either, being neither animal
nor spirit--that is, the supernatural is discussed as though it were apart
from people, and the natural as though people were apart from it. This necessarily forces English-speaking people into a position of alienation from the
world they live in. Such isolation is entirely foreign to American Indian
thought. At base, every story, every song, every ceremony tells the Indian
that each creature is part of a living whole and that all parts of that whole
are related to one another by virtue of their participation in the whole of being. 194
The belief that the relationship between a person and nature is nonhierarchical runs counter to the very foundations of Judeo-Christian theologies, which have set nature out to be an inanimate object to be dominated
by the "higher being"-man. This is a very different view indeed, than one
which sees humans as simply one of many in the universe. As every form
has some of the intelligent spirit of the Creator, we cannot but reverence all
parts of the creation.,,195 All parts of nature are living beings. Further, if
deities are present in all of nature, and nature itself is a deity (i.e. the Earth
as Mother, literally, not as metaphor), then one does not need an intermediary (such as a priest or minister) in order to simply communicate with one's
deities. Nor is there any need for a theological, institutionalized hierarchy
based on gender.
Here lies the answer to why it is so essential to culture that the image of
divinity be male. . .. And here is why the idea that earlier cultures might
have worshipped a Great Goddess remains to some minds shaped by this
192. Barsh, supra note 139, at 365 (citing A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSillP IN
27 (1981 ».
193. T.S. ELIOT, The Dry Salvages, in FOUR QUARTETS 21,21 (1943).
194. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 60.
195. BROWN, supra note 151, at 70 (citation omitted).
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culture absurd and unthinkable. For the proposition that woman, who is
nature, could be sacred is not a possible concept in a culture which is by
definition above nature. 196
A theology that rests in part on an established hierarchy within humanity, and without, will take a markedly different view of nature than one that,
for example, sees little spiritually significant distinction between a human
and animal. In fact, in many such religious views, animals have special
significance as manifestations of a deity, and because, according to some
creation myths, they may have been created before humans. Animals may
be seen as intermediaries between humans and deities. 197 All living things
come from one creation, and therefore all are related!98 Relationships extend outwards, from familial blood lines, to plants, and the elements. 199 For
instance, the Ifa tradition, a West African religious system which is also a
basis for Santeria and Lucumi, is based on the study of nature. 2OO Various
aspects of nature are not merely symbols in a theology, they are the essence
of what is often called God.
D. THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE
Consider an essential belief and knowledge that says the earth is alive,
she is the mother and she is sacred, that a particular set of mountains are not
only one of four sacred mountains marking the boundaries of your homeland, but are in fact a living deity. Or consider an essential belief and
knowledge that says your gods live in these same mountains, that they create
the rain and snow that allow you to grow, in dry desert soil, the corn that
you eat; and that the herbs, plants and animals you rely on in your prayers
and rituals are all located in these same mountains. Or consider the belief
and knowledge that your people first met with the Creator at a certain butte,
where your people learned their sacred ceremonies, and where you still go to
worship, pray and communicate with your deity. Or consider the belief and
knowledge that a certain tract of land has always been used by your people
for religious rituals, and it is an indispensable part of your religious life
(which is inseparable from your life overall). Now imagine that you have
been told by a court that the need for more ski slopes, parking lots and a new
ski lodge outweigh your interests in trying to protect your "church," the San
Francisco Peaks. These were the facts of Wilson v. Blo ck, 20 1 where the
court held that "the plaintiffs have not shown an impermissible burden on

196. SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE
71 (1981).
197. BROWN, supra note 151, at 38. Oftentimes, deities take the form of animals.
198. Barsh, supra note 139, at 366.
199. BROWN, supra note 151, at 53.
200. FATUNMBI, supra note 162, at 20.
201. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
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religion.,,202 This holding was reached in the face of testimony that stated:
It is my opinion that in the long run if the expansion is permitted, we
will not be able successfully to teach our people that this is a sacred
place... the basis of our existence as a society will become a mere
fairy tale to our people. .. The destruction of these practices will
also destroy our present way of life and culture. 203

The court's language and approach as evidenced by their holding
"notwithstanding the plaintiffs' concerns. . .,,204 reflects an absolute inability
and unwillingness to extend beyond a particular view of god and nature.
The court held that a plaintiff trying to restrict the government's use of its
land would have to show that "the government's proposed land use would
impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other site. ,,205
The court also noted that the established evidence presented in the case that
all of the San Francisco Peaks are sacred "does not establish the indispensability of the pennit area.,,206
This compartmentalized view of the problem is a clear indication that
the court does not have slightest comprehension of what the plaintiffs were
arguing. This statement is akin to telling a Muslim pilgrim, for example,
that a government's proposed transformation of Mecca into a resort city will
not impinge on any fundamental religious belief, as the Muslim can simply
go and pray elsewhere. Or telling a devout Catholic that she can no longer
take communion, but she can still believe in transubstantiation if she so
chooses, or a Jew that the Wailing Wall will now become a fast food restaurant, but one stone wall at which to pray is as good as any other.
What seems to be the bottom line for the court, in this case and others, is
the absolute supremacy of the historical, monotheistic view of god fIrst, then
humans, then nature, in a strict hierarchical relationship. What is also reflected in these cases is one culture's sanctity and reverence for the ownership of land, and from that, a fundamental, virtually unrestricted right to the
use of one's land, be it governmental or private property. This implicit
thread, running through a line of cases regarding sacred sites, became explicit in Fools Crow v. Gullet. 207 There, Fools Crow and others, on behalf
of the Lakota nation, and Bill Red Hat and others, on behalf of the Tsistsistas nation,208 sued the State Park Manager of Bear Butte State Park. The
202. Id. at 740. One hesitates to imagine what would be an impennissible burden.
203. Id. at 740 n.2 (quoting testimony of Abbott Sekaquaptewa, then-chainnan of the
Hopi tribe).
204. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 745 n.7.
207. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983).
208. The named individual plaintiffs included traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders. Id.
at 787. Fools Crow was Ceremonial Chief of the Teton Sioux, and a renowned spiritual
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plaintiffs' witnesses testified as to the absolute centrality and sacredness of
Bear Butte for the Lakota and Tsistsistas peoples. As in the Wilson case,
the government was the owner of the land and managed a park there. The
lawsuit arose from proposed further encroachments, although part of the suit
challenged the existing desecration of the area. 209 Tourists were allowed to
camp, roads and parking lots were cut through the site, and the proposed
additions included the construction of an access road and parking lot adjacent to an area used for religious ceremonies. 210 "Worshipers/campers"
could obtain permits that allowed ten day "camping" permits, as opposed to
the five day maximum at "non-religious" sites. 2II In discussing the fact that
the plaintiffs allegedly had no objections to the park providing outdoor bathrooms, free firewood and garbage disposals, and that permits had never been
denied for worship or ceremonial purposes,212 the court noted one exception:
when construction on the parking lot and road Hat the traditional ceremonial ground" precluded overnight camping. 213
In denying the plaintiffs' claim, the court in Fools Crow focused on several key points following a natural progression in reasoning derived from the
earlier cases of Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority2I4 and Badoni v.
Higginson 2I5 cases. First, the court found that the plaintiffs had no property
interest in the land,216 i.e., they did not own the land. 217 Second, it reasoned
leader. See generally MAILS, supra note 153. Arvol Looking Horse, another plaintiff in
the case, is the keeper of the Sacred Calf Pipe. Id. at 55.
209. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 785.
2] O. Id. at 788-89. The court also said that the specific area was used by Indians for
camping as well. But in reviewing the evidence cited in the opinion, the "camping" was
not recreational, but for extended (i.e., more than one day) ceremonies.
211. Id. at 789. The court noted that the record showed no evidence that plaintiffs had
ever been denied access for ceremony or worship. /d.
212. A critical point here, however, is that in fact permits had been denied. Barsh, supra
note 139, at 405 n.286. Barsh cites the Joint Appendix in the case and states that there
was uncontroverted testimony on this issue. Id. Barsh also states: "The court furthermore
accepted the State administrator's contentions that 'numerous people,' whom he could not
identify but 'appeared to be American Indian people,' had asked for road improvements,
and that medicine man Fools Crow had been 'pleased' with the road, over hearsay objections and Fools Crow's vigorous denial under oath." Id.
213. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 789 (emphasis added).
214. 620 F.2d ] 159 (6th Cir. 1980).
215. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
216. Fools Crow, 54] F. Supp. at 791. In Badoni, the Tenth Circuit had rejected the
district court's finding that the plaintiffs had no property interest in the land as dispositive.
Id. Rather, it held that "the government must manage its property in a manner that does
not offend the Constitution." Id. at 176. In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit had a more qualified view of the matter. It stated that while a lack of property interest "is a fact to be considered, we feel it should not be conclusive in view of the history of the Cherokee expulsion from Southern Appalachia." Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1159, 1164 (emphasis added).
217. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791. Private ownership ofland is essentially antithetical to religious beliefs that view humans as caretakers and guardians of nature and the
earth. Thus, while there was no "property" interest in the land, as owner, there clearly was
(and is) an interest in Bear Butte, generally, and specifically as a ceremonial place.
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that the religious practices were not absolutely prohibited. 218 However, worshiper's offerings were taken by campers, photographs were taken of cere219
monies, and campers and hikers frequently disrupted songs and prayers.
Nevertheless, the Fools Crow court concluded that the infringements on religious exercise at Bear Butte were not as bad, by comparison, as those in
Badoni22o The Badoni court held that none of these facts constituted a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or Sequoyah221 and therefore, were permissible. 222 The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the
defendants had impermissibly burdened their religion. 223
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a court holding likewise, had
another set of plaintiffs presented evidence that the government had taken
over ownership of Holy Trinity Church, had decided to put hiking trails,
parking lots and camping sites throughout the cemetery on the lands behind
the church, and had opened up the church for tours to be conducted during
church services and prayers. To complete the analogy, one would have to
extend this scenario to include a requirement that parishioners register before entering the church, obtain permits from the government stating when
they can pray, and limiting their visits to the church for praying and participation in services to times the government had pre-determined. I do not believe that there is a court anywhere in this country that would not immediately condemn such a practice and find, without hesitation, an absolute
violation of the First Amendment. Yet federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have upheld such practices time and again, as applied to Indian religions.
These issues came to a head in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association. 224 There, the United States Forest Service wanted to
build a paved road through federal lands. The road was to pass through the
Chimney Rock portion of Six Rivers National Forest in Califomia. 225 That
portion of land had traditionally been used by Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
Indians for religious rituals and practices; privacy, silence and the natural
state of the surroundings are integral parts of the religions. 226 The required
218. Id.
219. Id. at 788.
220. Badoni. 638 F.2d 172. In Badoni. the government's impounding water to form Lake
Powell drowned some of the Navajo plaintiffs' gods, the Navajos were denied access to a
sacred prayer spot, and tourists were allowed to visit Rainbow Bridge, a previously isolated sacred site.
221. Although in Sequoyah the impoundment created by the Tellico dam would flood
land the court acknowledged as a sacred homeland to the Cherokee people and destroy sacred sites, holy places and cemetaries, the court held it did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. Sequoyah. 620 F.2d 1159.
222. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
223. Id. at 793.
224. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
225. Id. at 442.
226. Id.
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environmental impact statement found that the building of a road "would
cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems. . .. ,,227 The fmal recommendation was that the road project be abandoned, a fmding ultimately rejected
by the Forest Service. 228 The District Court granted a permanent injunction,
based in part on a fmding that the road, and a timber harvesting plan also
proposed, would viola~e the Free Exercise Clause. The Ninth Circuit affrrmed in part, including the portion that rested on the fmding of a constitutional violation. 229 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court
reversed. Finding the issue in Lyng to be indistinguishable from Bowen v.
Roy,230 where applicants for benefits opposed the requirement of a Social
Security number for their daughter for fear it would rob her spirit,231 the
Court noted that:
The challenged Government action would interfere significantly with
private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to
their own beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their
religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights,
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. 232
Even in the face of expert testimony regarding the devastation the road
construction would cause, the Court refused to yield on its stance. It stated
that even were it to adopt the Ninth Circuit's prediction that the road would
"virtually destroy the . . . Indians' ability to practice their religion, the
Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding
respondent's legal claims. ,,233 The truly determinative factor was once again
the question of land ownership. In reviewing the religious rituals and ceremonies related to the land in question, the Court explicitly noted: "No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could
easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of
227. Id. (citing a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in the area commissioned by the Forest Service).
228. Id. at 442.
229. Id. at 444.
230. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
23 I . Id. at 696.
232. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). Some of the Court's tortured reasoning in
this case foreshadowed the disingenuous manueverings in the Smith case two years later.
The Lyng Court rejected the argument that the burdens on religious exercise here were
much greater than those in Bowen, stating that it could look to the underlying beliefs in
either case. Therefore, it noted that it could not tell the difference between the two claims,
and so the same result would obtain. In other words, the two claims seem to be the same,
but we can't (or, rather, won't) look beyond the surface to see whether that is true and
whether a different result warranted.
233. Id. at 45 I.
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public property.,,234 The language and tone of the statement makes clear the
very idea is ridiculous without ever explaining why. The sentiment underlying this statement-that there is of course, an understanding "by all" as to
why "we" would never want such a result-is distressingly consistent with
the jurisprudence in this area of the law. As Justice Brennan noted in his
dissent, "the Court embraces the Government's contention that its prerogative as landowner should always take precedence over a claim that a particular use of federal property infringes religious practices. ,,235 The virtual inviolability of land ownership, even when the owner is the government acting
as representative of the people, supersedes the claims of different groups to
continue their spiritual beliefs, traditions, cultures and histories, all of which
are interconnected.
What is difficult to discern in the line of cases discussed above is a just
basis for why it was acceptable for the Court, in one instance, to permit the
actual or virtual destruction of a people's way of life ("today's ruling sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiritual
well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents .... ,,236) under the guise of
refusing preferential treatment,237 while in the other, where the Amish community was involved, the Court readily struck down a state law which would
"ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States today.,,238 There Chief Justice Burger went to great lengths to expound on the virtues of the Amish239 and upheld the right of the Amish to live their lives relatively free of governmental
interference.
Ironically, although some of the Amish cultural and/or religious characteristics identified in that case were similar to the beliefs and traditions of
Native Americans, as set out in Badoni, Sequoyah, Fools Crow and Lyng,
yet characteristics met with opposite legal results. One such characteristic
was the relationship of the people to and with nature. Compare the Amish
devotion to "a life in harmony with nature and the soil ... ,,240 with the Navajo and Hopi, for whom the San Francisco Peaks are a living deity and a
source of healing plants and herbs and place of prayer and ceremonies. 241

234. [d. at 453.
235. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 452 ("The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike .... ").
238. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,212 (1972).
239. Id. at 222. See also id. at 212-13. "[T]he Amish community has been a highly successful social unit. ... Its members are productive and very law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modem forms .... " While all of the
above information was apparently very meaningful to Justice Burger, I can find no legal
relevance in it. One would hope he was not suggesting that religious liberty is or should
somehow be tied to some sort of merit test.
240. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
241. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 738 (1983).
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Or consider that in both Yoder and several of the sacred site cases, there was
expert testimony that the governmental action in question would have devastating consequences for the community involved. 242
In fact, as Justice Brennan made clear, there was no substantive difference between Yoder and Lyng. 243 Actually, Brennan's dissent went a step
further, proclaiming that indeed, the threat to the plaintiffs in Lyng, was
"both more direct and more substantial. ,,244 Justice Brennan identified explicitly what implicitly drove the majority's reasoning-an overriding concern for the Government's rights as owner and manager of land, and a fear
of numerous future Native American land use cases, seeking ever broader
prohibitions on land use. 245 Indeed, it is the dissent in Lyng which brings to
a head the general conflict between Judea-Christian values and perspectives
and those integral to earth-based religions. As Justice Brennan noted, Lyng
represented "yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between
two disparate cultures--the dominant Western culture, which views land in
terms of ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system
that holds land sacred.,,246
Further, as the dissent made clear, the Lyng decision would produce a
profound impact that the majority refused to even acknowledge. "Given today's ruling, that freedom [to maintain religious beliefs] amounts to nothing
more than the right to believe that their religion will be destroyed. ,,247 Given
case precedent, with an almost consistent lack of constitutional protections
being afforded earth-based religions, the Court's decision in Smith 248 two
years after Lyng should not have surprised anyone. 249 The monodirectional

242. "[C]ompulsory high school attendance could result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States today." Yoder, 406 U.S. at
212. "[C]onstructing a road ... 'would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of the
Northwest California Indian peoples. '" Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (citation omitted). "The Hopis and Navajos believe that
they owe a duty to the deities to maintain the San Francisco Peaks in their natural state.
They believe that breach of that duty will lead to serious adverse consequences for their
peoples." Wilson, 708 F. 2d at 740. "Plaintiffs believe that if humans alter the earth in
the area of the Bridge, plaintiffs' prayers will not be heard by the gods and their ceremonies will be ineffective to prevent evil and disease." Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172,
177 (10th Cir 1980).
243. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, l, dissenting).
244. Id. at 467-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 477 (Brennan, l, dissenting).
248. Empl. Div., Dep't. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Where the Supreme Court rejected the compelling interest test. The Plaintiffs, Smiths'
drug counselors, were denied unemployment compensation after losing their jobs because
of their spiritual use of peyote.
249. James Ryan has argued that free exercise cases generally do not receive enough at-
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journey of free exercise jurisprudence continues.

PART III: ALL ROADS ARE GOOD
Throughout this Article, I have argued that Judeo-Christian thought,
values and cultural characteristics dominate the jurisprudence of the Free
Exercise Clause. Even if one accepts that there may once have been a valid
historical basis for this (a relatively religiously homogenous population),
that basis no longer exists, and has not existed for a long while. The state of
American jurisprudence in the area of free exercise derives from, and is
dominated by, a monomaniacal demand for absolute certainty that is consistent with monotheistic religious thought. This is reflected both by the requirement that religion have a deftnition, and by the formulation of a defInition which dictates that religion be concerned with absolutes. That is, the
existing defmition requires that the belief system focus on answers, certainty, and "naming" the mystery, rather than simply acknowledging "that
which cannot be known."
Long ago, courts established a hegemonic defmition of what constitutes
religion. In the last few decades, only slight changes to that defmition have
appeared. Overall the path traveled in the realm of the Free Exercise Clause
has been straight and narrow. It has often been presumed that the problems
which exist in free exercise interpretation and application derive from the
specific defInition of religion being used,2S0 rather than with the idea of any
2SI
defInition at all.
I believe that it is not simply the defmition that is the
problem. Rather, we must step back and question why we strive for a
defmition at all. A defInition inherently contains within it the power to extention, which, he says, explains why the Smith decision provoked such a reaction. Ryan,
supra, note 17, at 1407-08. Even the Babalu-Aye decision, where plaintiffs actually won
on their claim, does not represent a true victory in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise
Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
There, where the City of Hialeah sought to prohibit animal sacrifice, a fundamental religious practice in the Santeria religion, it did so by poorly drafting statutes that were both
overly broad and narrowly drawn. See id. at 521-22. It was that fact, coupled with a legislative history that showed an absolute intention to reach only the Santeria church, that led
the Supreme Court to strike down the statutes. Id. at 534-42. It seems clear from both that
opinion, id. at 538-39, and the legislative history of the RFRA, that a "properly" drawn
statute prohibiting animal sacrifice could survive a constitutional free exercise challenge,
despite the practice's centrality to the Santeria religion. See, e.g., 139 CONGo REc.
S14,467 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("It is certainly not the intent of Congress to stifle the enforcement of religious-neutral laws that protect animals. ").
250. See, e.g., James M. Donovan, God Is As God Does: Law, Anthropology and the
Definiton of "Religion," 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 26-27 (1995).
251. But see George C. Freeman, ill, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion, "71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519-20 (1983). I agree with Freeman's conclusion that there can not be a workable definition, but not necessarily for all of the same reasons. As I have argued throughout this Article, I believe that the very idea of and need for
a definition, in and of itself, is, in some way, a specifically religious perspective, i.e., one
derived from a Judeo-Christian, monotheistic approach to the world and life.
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clude all that falls outside of its boundaries. Thus, if we mean to broaden
the jurisprudence in this area at all, in order to go beyond the boundaries of
the Judeo-Christian construct now being applied, then a "better" definition is
not the answer. Instead, we must look past the desire for absolute predictability and certainty, and embrace rather than shirk from "ad hoc" justice. 252
The implicit fear of ad hoc justice on one hand, and the longing for a workable defmition of religion on the other, are rooted in the same JudeoChristian principles that I discussed earlier in this Article-fear of the unknown and the desire to name and predict and thus to control (e.g., written
over oral traditions, man over nature, woman subordinate to man). For
these reasons, free exercise jurisprudence cannot genuinely protect a broader
class of religious claims unless it abandons its absolute definitional analysis.
A. NAMING
But in a moment that which is behind naming makes itself
known. . . . And all this knowledge is in the souls of everything, behind naming, before speaking, beneath words. 253
The focus on abetter, more inclusive defmition of religion is misplaced,
if the intention is to improve (i.e. make more fair) the application of the Free
Exercise Clause to non-Judeo-Christian religions. It seems that what is behind the craving for some level of exactitude, which a definition would arguably provide, is fear of the unknown and unnamed. This apprehension
includes a fear of the "other,"--that which is different. 254 Under these circumstances a clearer, more meaningful defmition of religion cannot expand
or enrich the jurisprudence in this area. This need for certainty and answers
is a part of Judeo-Christian tradition and thought. 255 A monotheistic religious tradition that emphasizes answers more than questions, when translated
into legal doctrine, lends itself quite easily to a predisposition against the
"other." If then, such a tradition gets manifested expressly, or otherwise, in
the jurisprudence of free exercise, as I have argued it does, it is that much
easier to understand the disconcerting results and specious reasoning obtained in so many free exercise cases. Consider the definitions of religion

252. "[I]t is important to have some objective guidelines in order to avoid ad hoc justice."
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J. concurring) (emphasis
added).
253. GRIFFIN BROWN, supra note 165, at 191.
254. "Monotheism posits a god whose essential attribute is that he [sic] is allpowerful. . .. But his power is most devastatingly that of an idea in people's minds,
which leads them to obey him ... and to reject other deities .... " RICH, supra note 185,
at 66.
255. Many other religions may have, to varying degrees, concerns about, and some need
for explanations and answers. However, I argue here that it is inherent in a monotheistic
religion. Where a dominant religion has pervaded the cultural values, traditions, and
overall jurisprudence of a society, the problems in defining religion are obvious.
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that have emerged over the decades in First Amendment cases?56
"Religion has reference to one's views of his [sic] relations to his Crea~
tor, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. ,,257 This theistic idea of religion held sway
well into this century. A move away from this narrow view began not in
constitutional cases, but in cases interpreting draft laws and exemptions. In
both United States v. Seege.,J58 and Welsh v. United States,259 the Court
went beyond a theistic perspective (which was reflected in the military's
conscientious objector exemption) to what was considered a more progressive approach. Beliefs that were "based upon a power or being, or upon a
faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent,,260 were deemed to be sufficient for purposes of conscientious
objector status. This followed what the Court had earlier done in Torcaso v.
T¥atkins. 261 While the Court in Yoder,262 pulled back somewhat from this
broad reading, this expanded idea of what constitutes religion (i.e., theism is
no longer the determinative factor) still carries great weight with courtS. 263
However, contained within this clearly Judeo-Christian framework are tenets
I have already described-preference for written over oral traditions, a subordinate view of women, and nature as subordinate to people. 264 Thus, a religious belief that "all a person knows is placed in the ground when that person is buried. . . ." and therefore flooding or moving those bodies destroys
not only the knowledge and beliefs of the buried person, but those particular
teachings as well,265 clearly stands outside of courts' general views and understandings about religion, and is ill served by even a non-theistic defmition. 266

256. The Internal Revenue Service also grapples with determining what constitutes a religion. While it does not have a fixed definition, it tends to rely on guidelines to determine
tax-exempt status. See Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and
the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE
FOREST L.REv. 855, 877-79 (1993); Terry A. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining
"Religion" For Purposes of Administering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 219 (1983).
257. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
258. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
259. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
260. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
261. 367 U.S. 488. The Court held that government cannot favor religions which were
based on a belief in the existence of God over religions which were not. Id. at 495.
262. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
263. "Under the modem view, 'religion' is not confined to the relationship of man with
his Creator, either as a matter oflaw or as a matter of theology. Even theologians oftraditionally recognized faiths have moved away from a strictly Theistic approach in explaining
their own religions." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
264. See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
265. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162.
266. This was demonstrated in the Sequoyah case, where demands for water superseded
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The defmition now used by the courts, on its face and as it has been interpreted and applied, generally favors only those systems of belief that are
based on and advance very particular principles. First, the belief system
must turn on an egocentric view of the world; "above all else, religions are
characterized by their adherence to and promotion of certain 'underlying
theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe. ",267 Second, this
defmition is predisposed towards those religions that establish a hierarchical
view of the world, within the religion and without. "Religion, as comprehended by the fIrst amendment now includes mere affIrmation of belief in a
supreme being.... ,,268 Thus, the move away from a rigid defInitional requirement of a belief in "God" to one that also allows for a broader monotheistic non-theistic perspective, while something of a progression, does not
yet ensure constitutional protections for earth-based religions. One impediment to real progress is the fact that new defmitions of religion are wedded
to a Judeo-Christian model of hierarchy.
When faced with less familiar religions, courts apply a "defInition by
analogy.,,269 "The modern approach thus looks to the familiar religions as
models in order to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or
beliefs is confronting the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as
unquestioned and accepted 'religions. ",270 The three general criteria for what
constitutes religion that are currently being applied in cases are:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief system as opposed to
an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by
the presence of certain formal and external signS.271
any right to protect religious beliefs and practices. While the court here, as in other sacred
site cases, recognized the beliefs asserted as religious ("the Cherokees have a religion
within the meaning of the Constitution"), id. at 1163, the recognition had no practical
value. The beliefs and practices, because they stood outside of Judeo-Christian principles
and perspectives and values, were therefore not appreciated and not protected in the same
way that "mainstream" religious beliefs have been.
267. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025,1033 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
908 (1982).
268. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
269. Id. at 207 (Adams, 1., concurring).
270. Id. (emphasis added).
271. A/rica, 662 F.2d at 1032, (citing Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207-10 (Adams, 1., concurring)). See also Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting Malnak criteria). The Callahan opinion was written by Judge Adams, sitting by designation. I am not
going to discuss this third indicium as I think that its meaning and interpretations are obvious. Judge Adams, in his concurrence in Malnak, when discussing this third indicium,
notes: "Of course, a religion may exist without any of these signs .... " Malnak, 592 F.2d
at 209. However, his footnote immediately following that statement quotes Durkheim as
stating: "In all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church [sic]." Id., at
n.44 (citation omitted). In earth-based religions, where one's relationship with his or her
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Because of the inherent problems with a defmition generally, and the
defmitions currently in use, in particular, this "new" approach offers no
greater protections to "other" religions than did earlier analyses. As to the
fIrst criteria, the use of the word "ultimate"-in the ordinary sense of the
word, fmal-is not a concept that generally has application in earth-based
religions. On its face the word does not appear problematic. However, the
interpretation makes clear it is a value-laden term. 272 In United States v.
Kauten, for example, ultimate concern was understood to mean that a believer would "accept martyrdom" and "disregard elementary self-interest"
rather than violate his or her religious beliefs. 273 In Africa, the term
"ultimate concerns" was applied to the detriment of MOVE, which was held
not to be a religion because there was no recognition of "a Supreme Being or
transcendental or all-controlling force.,,274 Thus the fIrst indicium currently
determinative of what constitutes a religion seems to require a showing that
one must be willing to martyr himself or herself, or at least subscribe to a
hierarchical ordering of the universe.
Additionally, what is meant by "ultimate" concerns or ideas is generally
understood to be teachings or answers to questions regarding issues such as
one's role in the universe and matters of right and wrong. "A science course
may touch on many ultimate concerns, but it is unlikely to proffer a systematic series of answers to them that might begin to resemble a religion. ,,275
Moreover, it is not suffIcient that a religion pose the question and provide
the answer. It must do so in a comprehensive and wide ranging way. Theredieties is very much a personal matter, and there is no real hierarchy imposed or required
in order to worship or pray, neither is there any need for buildings or specific organizational structures.
272. Jesse Choper has noted several specific problems with the "ultimate concerns" test.
CHOPER, supra note 7, at 70-74. He notes that it automatically excludes a number ofreligious traditions, id. at 71; that application of this concept to legal problems, when it was
primarily aimed at theologians and laypersons (formulated by the theologian Paul Tillich)
oversimplifies a complex theological argument; and finally, people may have ultimate concerns about a number of issues. This last point then, he argues, "is at odds with an important historical assumption that underlies the constitutional protection granted by the Religion Clauses: that religion comprehends matters with which the government . . . is not
competent to interfere." Id. at 72. George Freeman has also identified numerous problems with the ultimate concerns test. See Freeman, supra note 251, at 1534-41.
273. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703,708 (2d Cir. 1943). The idea of martyrdom
and a disregard of "elementary self-interest" would seem, in and of itself, to reinforce
ideas of hierarchy, and is a concept with historical links to Judea-Christian traditions but
not necessarily earth-based ones. Additionally, George Freeman has shown how unworkable this interpretation is. He notes that "self-interest might be an individual's ultimate
concern." Freeman, supra note 251, at 1535 (emphasis added).
274. A/rica, 662 F.2d at 1033. The Court described MOVE as having an ideology requiring its members to "live in harmony with what is natural, or untainted." Id. at 1027. It is
also described as a "revolutionary organization." Id. at 1026.
275. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, 1., concurring) (emphasis added). See also Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033. Also, as Freeman notes, an "ultimate concern" test for free exercise has the end result of a standard "so narrow that only a few could expect to enjoy its
protection." Freeman, supra note 251, at 1541.
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fore, as the court in Malnak noted, "certain isolated answers to ultimate
questions, however, are not necessarily 'religious' answers, because they
lack the comprehensiveness, the second of the three indicia. ,,276 Thus, a religion must "lay claim to an ultimate and comprehensive 'truth. ",277 But
this defmition is nothing if not an almost exact likeness of the monotheistic,
Judeo-Christian perspective. It harks back to Biblical teachings of "I am
the way, the truth .... ,,278 This defmition requires absolutes, that is, the
emphasis is on the destination, not the journey.279 Thus, despite declarations
to the contrary, a non-hierarchical belief system that prefers and embraces
the mystery to the solution, and the idea of god as adjective or verb and not
as noun, is not and will not be truly acknowledged as a religion, for the purposes of receiving the same types of protection afforded "mainstream" religions.
B. FEAR OF FLYING
The desire for a defmition of religion is tied to an absolute reluctance to
treat religious freedom cases on an "ad hoc" basis. While this reluctance is
one generally present in the law overall, it is also true that the law does recognize and accept the need for ad hoc determinations, the "best interests of
the child" in custody determinations being, perhaps, the most obvious example. 280 Although a court may acknowledge the need for "flexibility and
careful consideration,,,281 there is a marked preference for avoiding ad hoc
justice. I believe that the free exercise of religion is best served by no definition, and by a case-by-case deterrrunation. Less, not more dogma, is required here. If courts genuinely recognized the predispositions inherent in
existing free exercise jurisprudence, and undertook to consciously and explicitly ignore them, they could then, without any need for a defmition of religion, truly hear and analyze each claim of free exercise on its own merits.
Indeed, by explicitly rejecting both the existing defmition of religion and any
grail-like quest for a valid definition, courts would be able to come much
closer to something resembling a genuine model of religious freedom. Under
this scenario, one would no longer fmd a court reflexively applying a be-

276. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208-09 (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
277. Id. at 209 (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
278. 14 John 9 (emphasis added).
279. This is also seen in the emphasis in the idea of heaven and hell, i.e., the preoccupation with life after death. In many earth-based religions, by contrast, how one lives one's
life is important not for what it may guarantee after death, but because it is precisely one's
relationship with all other living beings during one's life that matters.
280. I am not prepared here to address the debates surrounding court custody determinations or the appropriateness of the best interest standard. I am simply asserting that courts,
lawyers, academics and/or legislatures have sometimes arrived at the conclusion that fairness, in some instances, is best served by a case by case determination, with only the very
broadest of guidelines established.
281. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210 (Adams, J., concurring).

78

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:1

lief/conduct dichotomy to a religious claim where the religion itself adheres
to no such distinction. 282 Nor would a court automatically assume that recreational use of public lands has greater value than the need to keep sacred
the place of a people's teachings, rituals and deities.
An authentically just free exercise jurisprudence cannot exist if the underlying approach is one that remains grounded in a strict, monotheistic, hierarchical religious perspective. Such a view requires absolutes, and thus
dogmas, and thus an inherent rejection of the "other." I urge, instead, an
approach that embraces uncertainty, which contains within it an openness to
"other" possibilities; other views; other roads.

CONCLUSION
The Free Exercise Clause has been, since the early days of the Constitution, predisposed towards Judea-Christian religions and against earth-based
religions. Judea-Christian traditions have permeated how courts think about
and treat what is and isn't deemed religion, for the purposes of extending
constitutional protections. Not only have certain traditional Judea-Christian
characteristics colored any defmition of religion and analysis of religious
claims, they have also shaped the very approach typically applied in free exercise cases. The reaching out for a defmition, not simply the defmition itself, and the avoidance of "ad hoc" justice derive from particular religious
traditions that do not readily apply, and often stand in complete opposition
to, earth-based religions. Until such time as courts are truly committed to
abandoning both the defmition and the reluctance to treat each religious
claim on its own terms, it is not possible for earth-based religions to achieve
equal and fair treatment under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.

282. Indeed, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in Smith, the First Amendment does not
make such a distinction. Empl. Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 893 (1990).

